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This thesis examines the actions of democratically elected leaders perceived to 
create threats to democracy. These leaders are often political outsiders who come to 
power after established politicians and the “traditional” way of conducting democratic 
politics have been discredited. Once in power, some of their actions are seen as 
nonconforming with established democratic norms. This thesis investigates the areas 
where setbacks and major threats to democracy have occurred in Venezuela and how the 
international community might respond most effectively to such threats. 
This thesis advances four definitions of democracy drawn from the relevant 
literature, electoral, delegative, liberal, and substantive. It then examines the actions of 
the government on the different dimensions of democracy set forth by those definitions: 
the holding of free and fair elections, respect for human rights and civil liberties, a 
functioning system of checks and balances, and subordination of the military to civilian 
rule. Although the Chavez regime conforms to the minimal conditions of an electoral 
democracy, it is shown to fall short of accepted standards of liberal democracy. It also 
falls short of the vision of participative democracy advanced by President Chavez 
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This thesis examines the actions of democratically elected leaders perceived to 
create threats to democracy. These leaders are often political outsiders who come to 
power after established politicians and the “traditional” way of conducting democratic 
politics have been discredited. Once in power, some of their actions are seen as 
nonconforming with established democratic norms. This thesis investigates the areas 
where setbacks and major threats to democracy have occurred in Venezuela and how the 
international community might respond most effectively to such threats. 
This thesis advances four definitions of democracy drawn from the relevant 
literature, delegative, liberal, and substantive. It then examines the actions of the 
government on the different dimensions of democracy set forth by those definitions, 
elections, human rights and civil liberties, checks and balances, and militarism. Since 
coming to power President Chavez has been conducting a massive experiment to change 
the political space and culture of Venezuela. He has called numerous elections and 
referenda, convoking a constitutional assembly, which eventually rewrote a new 
constitution. The constitution centralizes power in the figure of the president in many 
ways. President Chavez, his loyal followers o his party control all governmental branches 
of power, making difficult to provide the necessary checks and balances necessary in any 
democracy. Although the Chavez regime conforms to the minimal conditions of an 
electoral democracy, it is shown to fall short of accepted standards of liberal democracy. 
It also falls short of the vision of participative democracy advanced by President Chavez 
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This thesis examines the actions of democratically elected leaders perceived to 
create threats to democracy. These leaders are often political outsiders who come to 
power after established politicians and the “traditional” way of conducting democratic 
politics have been discredited. Once in power, some of their actions are seen as 
nonconforming with established democratic norms. This thesis investigates the areas 
where setbacks and major threats to democracy have occurred in Venezuela and how the 
international community might respond most effectively to such threats.  
B. BACKGROUND  
Venezuela has long been considered a bastion of democracy in Latin America. In 
fact it was, for the longest time, considered the antithesis of stereotypical Latin American 
polities. It had two very strong political parties, a large middle class, sound and stable 
political institutions, vast oil reserves, and a respected, apolitical military. All this has 
changed. 
In Venezuela, unequal social conditions, out of control government corruption 
and worsening economic conditions began a progressive deinstitutionalization of the two-
party system. The two traditional parties, Acción Democrática (AD) and the  Christian 
Democratic Party (COPEI) could no longer provide the basic needs, goods and services 
the populace required. The conditions for a complete breakdown of the party system were 
in place. When president Carlos Andres Perez attempted to reverse the pattern of 
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economic performance by implementing a package of neoliberal policies, riots followed 
and the military had to be sent into the streets. 
On the night of 3 February 1992, insurrectional members of the military, led by 
the leaders of the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200), decided to 
take actions into their own hands and depose the regime. The military uprising failed to 
take control of the state. It succeeded, however, in launching the political career of one of 
the leaders of the coup.  
Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez first captured national attention on 4 February 
1992 as the leader of the military columns that attacked Caracas. Although the coup had 
failed, Chávez became an instant celebrity with the masses when he defiantly told a live 
national television audience:  
“! Comrades! Sadly¼for now ¼the objectives that we were pursuing were not 
achieved here in the capital. It means that, we here in Caracas, did not achieve 
control.¼Listen to my words, listen to the Comandante (LTC) Chávez, that sends you 
this message, the objectives planned nationally will not be possible—for the moment .”1 
The image of Lieutenant Colonel Chávez looking defiantly and straight into the camera 
made him an instant celebrity amongst the poor masses who, although they failed to join 
the insurrection, now revered him for standing up to the corrupt regime. Chávez was 
court-martialed and sent to prison, but after only two years he and his fellow coup-
plotters were pardoned, and granted all their civic rights back. 
                                                 
1 Words expressed by LTC Hugo Chávez Frias on a national televised address following his surrender 
after the failed coup, Caracas, Venezuela in Zago, Angela, “La Rebelión de los Angeles,” Caracas, Fuentes 
Editores, 1992, p. 78. 
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While in prison Chávez recalled in writings and letters that the turning point for 
his motivation to lead the failed coup was the so-called “Caracazo” in 1989. Protests 
against the Perez government’s neoliberal economic policies, were met with repression in 
which many people died.  Chávez recalls “people went into the streets and this so-called 
democratic government answered with guns and rifles¼ we had two alternatives as 
soldiers: continue massacring our people on the order of the tyrant dressed as a democrat, 
or aim the rifles against him.”2 
When Hugo Chávez was pardoned he went on a national and internationa l 
crusade, traveling abroad to Argentina and Cuba. He continued his political activism with 
the Movimiento Bolivareano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200), promoting absenteeism in 
the gubernatorial elections of 1995. His political speeches were infused with fiery 
rhetoric against representative democracy and in particular against the two-party system 
(AD-COPEI) in Venezuela. 
In December of 1998, running on a populist platform to end corruption and to rid 
Venezuela of 40 years of “partyarchy”3, Hugo Chávez Frias was elected President of 
Venezuela. Finally, he had achieved through the ballot box what he couldn’t achieve 
militarily six years before when he led a bloody coup attempt. 
Since taking office in February of 1999, president Chávez has steadily been 
conducting a massive “democratic experiment” designed to overcome the “partyarchy” 
and corruption of the past. President Chávez has often described Venezuela’s political 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Jennifer L. McCoy, “Chávez and the End of ‘Partyarchy’ in Venezuela”, Journal of Democracy, 
December 1999. 
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project as one of “direct protagonist and participative democracy.”4 Central to that thesis 
was the role of the National Assembly, which rewrote the Constitution. In the 
“Bolivarean” Constitution, even though many articles are perceived to give much greater 
power to the Executive, there are also articles in which the citizens participate via 
referenda, initiatives, town hall meetings and recalls. He also has concentrated power by 
appointing members of his party and the military to positions and institutions, which all 
report to the executive. Chávez’s grip on power, his charisma and his attraction to the 
poor are deeply rooted in his “Bolivarian Messianism”. This doctrine is a blend of 
romantic idealism, militarism, patriotism and socialism. Many fear that he is moving 
swiftly towards one- man rule.  
The Venezuelan case is representative of a broader pattern emerging in Latin 
America. Democratically elected leaders are increasingly relying on seemingly non-
democratic means to change political institutions weakened by inefficiency and 
corruption. The democratic façade is maintained by calling referenda and periodic 
elections, in which the government faces little or no challenge from a non-existent or 
weak opposition. By maintaining this democratic façade, they avoid criticism or 
sanctions from the international community, mainly the U.S., without whose investments 
and aid they could not survive. Some policy makers are calling these regimes “rogue 
democracies.”5 In such democracies, elections are held periodically, but there is a lack of 
horizontal accountability, universal respect for civil liberties and sound civil-military 
                                                 
4 Norberto Ceresole, “Caudillo, ejercito, pueblo. El Modelo Venezolano o la postdemocracia”, 
Caracas, Venezuela, February 1999. 
5 Barbara Crossette, “ When Democracy Runs off the Rails” New York Times, June 4, 2000 accessed 
online at: h ttp://www.nytimes.com/library/review/060400rogue-democracy-review.html  
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relations. As will be shown, President Chávez’s vision of participative democracy (and 
his practice of it) violates some of the basic principles of liberal democracy In addition; it 
will be shown that, in practice, Chávez also violates his own vision of democracy.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
As a single case study, this thesis will focus on the Venezuelan regime to generate 
hypotheses about the nature of emerging threats to democracy and how they might be 
addressed. This thesis draws on the relevant literature to develop a framework for 
categorizing democracies and then uses this framework to assess the state of democracy 
in Venezuela. It will conclude by offering some policy recommendations on how to deal 
with these regimes. 
D. IMPORTANCE 
In Latin America today democracy faces new challenges and threats. Democracy 
is no longer threatened by military- led coups or  “self-coups”. In those cases, obvious 
attacks on democracy occurred as democratically elected executives were deposed or 
legislatures shut down. The reaction and response, not only by the international 
community but also by civil society in the countries where it happened, was swift.  
Today, however, the biggest challenges and threat come in the form of a more 
subtle erosion and deterioration of democratic norms. U.S. policy makers find itself in the 
difficult position of knowing how to deal with this newer kind of threat and the leaders 
behind it. In many of the cases this deterioration comes from democratically elected 
popular leaders-- leaders who possess enormous charisma and utilize their popularly 
given mandate to concentrate power in the executive branch of government.  
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There are many examples of this new kind of threat. Carlos Menem in Argentina, 
Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, Alberto Fujimori in Peru and now Hugo Chávez 
Frias in Venezuela, have all attempted to rule using presidential decrees and bypassing all 
other democratic institutions.  The Venezuelan case is particularly important to study 
because Chávez, more than any of the others, has developed an extensive alternative 
vision of democracy to justify his actions. 
The thesis is important because the promotion of democracy is vital to our 
national interests, and is a key part of the United States national security strategy. Also 
the case of Venezuela is particularly significant because it is a large oil producer and 
supplier and one of our most important trading partners in the region. Hugo Chávez 
Frias’s ideas about democracy, and his resultant actions, are not only a threat to 
democracy in Venezuela but also other democratic regimes in Latin America, like 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and even Colombia. Hugo Chávez has been very supportive of coup 
movements in Ecuador, indigenous movements in Bolivia, and has asserted an affinity for 
leftist guerrillas in Colombia. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II advances four different perspectives on democracy, ranging from two 
minimalist definitions (electoral and delegative democracy) to two more expansive 
visions of democracy (liberal and substantive).  The position of the United States foreign 
policy apparatus on democracy and Chávez’s vision are situated relative to these four 
perspectives.  .  
The next three chapters then evaluate the situation in Venezuela according to 
these definitions of democracy. Chapter III reviews the extent to which president Chávez 
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has respected civil liberties and other conditions necessary for free and fair elections. 
Chapter IV covers the new Bolivarian constitution and its impact on the relationship 
between the branches, the executive, the National Assembly (AN), the Supreme Justice 
tribunal (TSJ) and two new “People’s power” branches, paying particular attention to the 
issues of checks and balances. Chapter V evaluates the extent to which the military plays 
the kind of expansive and autonomous role that is generally considered inconsistent with 
democracy. 
Finally, Chapter VI will offer conclusions on how some of the actions taken by 
Hugo Chávez Frias violate the U.S. definitions and his own definitions of democracy. 
Based on the preceding analysis, it will make some recommendations to U.S. policy 
makers on confronting the challenges of promoting democracy under these 
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II. DEFINING DEMOCRACY 
 
 
This chapter will examine four definitions and perspectives on democracy. It 
begins with the most minimal notions of electoral democracy, and discusses a particular 
version of this, delegative democracy. Third, it highlights the more extensive procedures 
of liberal democracy. The fourth view, focuses on popular participation and social and 
economic outcomes. In addition, this chapter situates President Chávez’s vision of 
democracy within these four definitions and shows how it differs from the view of United 
States policy makers. 
A. ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY  
The focus of this definition centers on the notion of free and fair elections held 
periodically. Political offices are thus filled through multiparty elections. Additionally, 
procedural democracy calls for peaceful and uncontested transfer of power after the 
election results are accepted.  
Larry Diamond defines a minimalist electoral democracy as “one that usually 
acknowledges the need for minimum levels of freedom (of speech, press, organization 
and assembly) in order for competition and participation to be meaningful.”6 In sum, an 
electoral definition of democracy focuses exclusively on periodic free and fair elections 
with minimum levels of respect to civil liberties.  
B. DELEGATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Delegative democracy represents a version of electoral democracy that has 
become widespread in Latin America, particular in moments of economic crisis.  In 
                                                 
6 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy Towards Consolidation, The John Hopkins University 
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“delegative democracy”7 presidents believe that because they are voted into office with a 
large mandate, they can make decisions without listening to the other branches of power.  
As opposed to producing a pluralistic institutional representation, elections delegate 
tremendous authority to whomever is elected. Because of personal charisma and popular 
backing, elected officials may even rule by decree, in order to swiftly implement changes 
to produce the results the people want.8 
Delegative democracy entails the “strengthening of the executive institutions 
above all others and upholds the president as the sole embodiment of the interests of the 
nation.”9 In delegative democracies “voters are mobilized by clientelistic ties and 
populist, personalistic appeals, parties and independent interest groups are weak and 
fragmented.”10  The people give the ruler a clear mandate to govern for them and to “fix” 
the democratic institutions, which are corrupt, unnecessary or inefficient. In this type of 
polyarchy, the executive places a great deal of stress on vertical accountability (e.g., the 
link between the president and the people ), but horizontal accountability is extremely 
weak or absent. In contrast, in a representative democracy both vertical and horizontal 
accountability (checks and balances) are present.11  
                                                 
press, Baltimore and London, 1999   
7 O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 
1994) 
8 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy Towards Consolidation, The John Hopkins University 
press, Baltimore and London, 1999, 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Charles D. Kenney, “Reflections on Horizontal Accountability: Democratic Legitimacy, Majority 
Parties and Democratic Stability in Latin America, paper prepared for the conference on Institutions, 
Accountability, and Democratic Governance in Latin America, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 
University of Notre Dame, May 8-9,2000   
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C. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
As more states satisfy “electoral” conceptions of democracy, it is necessary to 
evaluate the extent to which they meet the other freedoms and requirements that are 
frequently considered important for democracy. Phillipe Schmitter and Terry Karl, for 
example, argue that “Popularly elected officials, must be able to exercise their 
constitutional powers, without being subjected to overriding opposition from unelected 
officials.”12 Even if elections are held periodically, there must also be autonomy and 
accountability by those elected. If these conditions do not exist then, the real competition 
and participation will not satisfy and present other alternative and options to the 
electorate. Moreover, Karl often mentions the “fallacy of electoralism” or “the faith that 
merely holding elections will channel political action into peaceful contest among elites 
and accord public legitimacy to the winners.”13 Multiparty elections, which exclude 
significant portions of the electorate, thus leaving important segments from participating 
and having their interests represented, are considered less than democratic according to 
this view.   
These additional elements, as discussed by Larry Diamond, include the absence of 
domains of power for the military or other actors which are not accountable to the 
electorate, the existence of checks and balances between branches of government (what 
has been called “horizontal accountability”), and respect of the rule of law, in which laws 
                                                 
12 Phillipe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is… and Is Not,” Journal of 
Democracy, February 1991, Vol. 2, No. 3,  
13 Ibid. 
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are applied fairly to all14. These conditions are at the heart of the definition of “liberal 
democracy.” 
D.  SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY 
Substantive democracy stresses the right of the people to participate in social and 
economic rights, like free education and health care. The incorporation of social and 
economic dimensions to democracy was a popular approach with scholars in the 1960s 
and 1970s with the triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba and the ascension of the left in many 
Latin American countries.15 In a substantive democracy, vertical accountability of leaders 
to “the people” through policies designed to correct social inequalities is stressed over the 
horizontal accountability of liberal representative democracy.  The stress on popular 
participation in substantive democracy also has a procedural dimension, with the people 
frequently being organized in a centralized party or in state-sponsored popular 
organizations.  
After 40 years of Castro’s regime and continent-wide experiences with 
authoritarian rule taught leftists the importance of political rights in a “bourgeois 
democracy”, scholars and leftist practitioners today tend to stress procedural notions of 
democracy. However, discussions of substantive democracy are likely to gain ground in 
the future, at least among the people, as social and economic inequalities exacerbated by 
neoliberal economic models persist. Even many scholars who embrace liberal notions of 
democracy argue that a certain level of social economic equality is necessary for the 
effective exercise of political rights. Kenneth Roberts argues that “ social and economic 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy Towards Consolidation, The John Hopkins University 
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inequalities can easily be translated into concentrations of power in the political sphere 
that skew the articulation of popular interests and block the exercise of popular 
sovereignty.  Social and economic equality is not a substantive outcome that is external to 
the functioning of democratic procedures but a prerequisite for equal access and unbiased 
democratic contestation and thus a vital indicator of procedural fairness.”16 
E. VIEWS OF THE U.S. AND PRESIDENT CHÁVEZ ON DEMOCRACY 
For the most part U. S. policy makers, when dealing with other Latin American 
nations in areas of democracy, have often operated under an electoral notion of 
democracy and what has been called the “fallacy of electoralism”, that is equating 
elections with democracy. During the height of the cold war and the expansion of 
democracy during “The Third Wave of Democratization”, policy makers were more often 
concerned with at least fulfilling the electoral requirements of democracy, than in 
promoting the other more complex issues of democratic practices. Essentially, as long as 
countries were conducting periodic, “free and fair” elections, U.S. policy makers more 
often than not turned their heads the other way when it came time to evaluate 
democracies in other democratic arenas such as respect for civil liberties and human 
rights. 
Along with regional stability and economic prosperity, promotion of democracy is 
one of the major elements in the U.S. National Security Strategy. Policy makers believe 
that democratic nations bring economic prosperity and stability to a region; however, 
experience shows that these positive benefits stem from liberal democracies and not 
                                                 
press, Baltimore and London, 1999. 
16 Kenneth M. Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru, 
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electoral democracies. For this reason, as well as the collapse of the Soviet and Eastern 
European communism and a sharp increase in the diffusion of democratization, the U.S. 
is much more concerned today with promoting aspects of democracy other than just 
elections 17. Some of these, which are much harder to promote, are respect for civil 
liberties and human rights, political pluralism and inclusion, sound judicia ry reforms, 
military subordination to civilian rule, and a participative civil society. U.S. policy 
makers no longer see these aspects as secondary to the electoralist notion. 
In contrast to this vision of liberal democracy, President Chávez promotes a 
project of “direct protagonist and participative democracy” in Venezuela.18.  Chávez 
loathes representative democracy. At every opportunity he gets he states that 
representative democracy along with “savage neo- liberalist economic models” are the 
causes of most problems in the world and, in particular, in Venezuela. At the last Ibero-
American Summit in Panama in November 2000, he stated that “the only thing 
representative democracy did was for a bastard elite class to have possession of power 
and surrender people into poverty,¼”19 Also in an interview with the Washington Post in 
late November Chávez stated that “Representative democracy had failed Venezuelans 
because those who had been elected to govern for the people had betrayed them and 
                                                 
Stanford University press, Stanford, California, 1998 
17 Ibid. 
18 Norberto Ceresole, “Caudillo, ejercito, pueblo. El Modelo Venezolano o la postdemocracia”, Caracas, 
Venezuela, February 1999. 
19 “Chavez: End 'Tyranny of the Small Elite’, Washington Post, Sunday October 15, 2000, accessed online at 
http://www.washintongpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7305-2000Oct14.html  [20 Oct 2000] 
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governed for small elites ¼ so therefore I am was creating a new model of political 
participation¼”20  
Chavez’s model relies on direct mechanisms of participation rather than the 
indirect mechanisms of representative democracy. These direct mechanisms include 
initiatives, which allow citizens to be involved directly in lawmaking, bypassing the 
legislature; referenda which allow citizens to veto laws or answer critical questions 
needed for new laws to be passed; and recalls which allow citizens to remove an elected 
official from office prior to his term ending.   
President Chavez’s vision combines different elements of the four definitions of 
democracy discussed above. His vision meets the minimum definition of an electoral 
democracy, by calling for periodic elections and the observation of a minimum level of 
respect to civil liberties.  It contains most elements of a delegative democracy, by 
stressing vertical accountability directly to the people. And arguing that a mandate to 
govern, gives him the right to ignore, checks and balances from the ”corrupt” institutions 
left over from representative democracy. Chavez’s vision clearly contradicts the more 
expansive definitions of liberal democracy, by rejecting its horizontal checks and 
balances and arguing that its social and economic results exclude the people. Finally, his 
vision is similar to definitions of substantive democracy in stressing the centrality to 
democracy of social and economic policies that serve the people. Like substantive 
democracy he stresses mechanisms for “direct” popular participation in politics. The 
major difference is that president Chavez does not limit this to state sponsored 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
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associations; but also emphasizes the role of electoral mechanisms (e.g. referenda, 
initiatives, recalls) for providing not only a means of popular participation in government 
but also a popular check on the government, including the executive. 
President Chávez truly believes that the problems Venezuela faces today are 
products of the 40 years of corrupt “partyarchy”.  Both parties, AD and COPEI lost the 
support of an overwhelming majority of the people. The increased perception of 
corruption amongst the leaders and government officials, the decline in quality of life, the 
government’s inability to provide basic goods to people and the economic and social 
performance of the “Punto Fijo” governments, disenchanted the majority of the 
Venezuelans and led them and Hugo Chávez to reject the major elements of 
representative democracy models. 
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The following chapters will evaluate the extent to which President Chávez’s 
practices of democracy matches these different definitions. It will show that although 
Venezuela is an electoral democracy meeting some of the minimalist requirements, it 
cannot be labeled a liberal democracy. In addition, the evidence shows that President 
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An important element of any definition of democracy is that free and fair 
elections are conducted in periodic intervals. In addition, the respect for civil liberties 
enables participation and contestation in the elections. For over 40 years Venezuela was 
considered a sound democracy. It had a strong two- party political system; periodic 
elections and the transfer of power from one party to the other were accomplished orderly 
and peacefully.  This chapter will examine the extent to which the Chávez government 
has adhered to democratic norms in the areas of elections, human rights and civil 
liberties. It will argue that government actions in these areas violate the norms of liberal 
democracy and fall short of President Chávez’s vision of a participative model of 
democracy.  
A. ELECTIONS       
For 40 years in the period also known as “the Pact of Punto Fijo”, elections in 
Venezuela were held periodically with both parties alternating power. This system 
endured for a long time, because of the foundational pact by both of the traditional 
parties.  The Pact of Punto Fijo gave the two main parties a monopoly on political 
representation and they colluded to prevent third parties or independent representatives 
from gaining office.  Michael Coppedge in his book, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks, 
Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in Venezuela, argues that, “ this interpretation 
is in line with the so-called ‘elite theory of democracy’ in which democracy requires only 
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a periodic competition among parties or candidates for the right to rule.”21 At election 
time Venezuelans used to say, “acta mata voto” meaning once the electoral act was 
signed no more votes were accepted. All this irregularities gave way to a deep electoral 
reform.  Electoral reforms were needed to change many perceived allegations of fraud 
and irregularities.  In short, during Punto Fijo period the people did not participate (the 
parties controlled everything) and the end result was corruption, social inequality, and 
bad government. Chavez believes that popular participation will lead to a good 
government on behalf of the poor.  
President Chávez in his governmental agenda calls for a complete revamping of 
all the “corrupt and rotten” political institutions that blocked progress and the creation of 
a socially just society. 22  Isaias Rodriguez, the former Vice-president, stated that “what 
has to be done is not fix the old social order, but to re-do it, re-build it, re- found it, and 
define it in light of the new institutions of power¼”23 Part of this plan to re-found 
institutions was the holding of elections for a unicameral National Constituent Assembly 
(ANC), which eliminated the bicameral Congress, and was given a six-month mandate to 
rewrite the Constitution. The Constituent Assembly was the primary mechanism to 
“jumpstart” the other institutions that had been inefficient, corrupt, and made “rotten” by 
40 years of Partyarchy in Venezuela. This led to several elections and referenda.  
                                                 
21 Coppedge, Michael, Strong Parties and Lame Ducks, Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in 
Venezuela, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1994 
22 “La Propuesta de Hugo Chávez, para transformar a Venezuela una Revolution Pacífica, Caracas, 
Venezuela, September 1998, accessed online at http://www.cordiplan.gov.ve.prog-gob.htm [6 Jan 2000] 
23 Isaias Rodriguez in Ismael Perez Vigil, “Liderazgo, Sociedad Civil y Participacion Politica”, 
Venezuela Analitica, June 14, 2000 accessed online at: http://www.analitica.com/va/politica/opinion [22 
Jun 2000] 
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In addition to the referendum to convoke the National Constituent Assembly 
(ANC) and elections to select its members, Venezuelans have been called to the polls 
four additional times by the Chávez’s government in the past two years. Two of these 
occasions were elections: the so-called “megaelections” in which all positions, from the 
president down to secretaries of parochial boards, were contested and elections for 
mayors.  Two were referenda: to approve the new Constitution to  “democratize” labor 
unions.  
International observers have judged all elections to be conducted in a free, fair 
and transparent manner since November 1998. In every case President Chávez’s 
coalition, Polo Patriotico (PP) resulted as the clear winner. In this elections the PP 
obtained over 90% of the seats (e.g., they took 119 ANC seats of 125). The presence of 
international observation has given legitimacy not only to the electoral process, but also 
to the overall results. Even with the presence of these observers, the electoral processes 
have not been problem free. There have been technical problems with databases and 
software; in some cases the parties, the media and analysts have called the fairness and 
transparency of certain races into question. In particular, some alleged fraud violations 
and irregularities at the voting places. Still pending from the “Megaelections” are several 
contested races, in which the losing candidates have protested the results. 
Before the postponement of the mega-elections in May 2000, the National 
Electoral Council (CNE) that had been appointed by the National Assembly to conduct 
these elections was under extreme fire and criticism by opposition parties and civil 
society. The National Assembly was dominated by members of Chávez’s party, the 
Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) and had named only party sympathizers to an 
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electoral council, which was traditiona lly composed of representatives from all parties. 
Once in power, the CNE dismissed key personnel that had any experience or knowledge 
in electoral processes, to name their own personnel to key posts within the CNE. Those 
actions were seen by the opposition as a clear intent to commit fraud by not allowing 
representatives from their parties to oversee the actions within the CNE.  
In the end, what resulted in the cancellation of the megaelections was the 
complete mishandling of the preparations for the elections. Under the best of 
circumstances, the megaelections posed a complex, technical challenge.  The new 
Constitution called for a re- legitimization of all powers in these elections; this meant that 
over 30,000 candidates were competing for over 6,000 offices).  The partisan decision by 
the CNE to dismiss experienced personnel and replace them with party loyalists greatly 
increased the challenge.  The CNE failed to meet this challenge, committing a myriad of 
technical mistakes (e.g., not updating databases, uploading without enough time to 
publish proper electoral lists and conduct “dry-runs”). Former President Carter, the head 
of an international observer delegation, stated “this was the most complex process he had 
ever observed…he concluded that the best decision was to postpone the election, to avoid 
a more serious and violent situation from happening.”24  
As a result of this fiasco, the CNE resigned under extreme pressure from civil 
society. A new five-member Council was again appointed, although this time, civil 
society, in particular the two organizations that pressured for the postponement of the 
elections had some influence over the names chosen. The CNE was able to conduct the 
                                                 
24 Alicia LaRotta Moran, “Lo mas complejo que hemos visto”, El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, 24 
may 2000 accessed online at: http://www.eud.com [29 May 2000] 
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July version of the megaelections successfully, but many civil society organizations 
continued to distrust the CNE because of its past incompetence and because they judged 
civil society participation the appointment process to be inadequate. 
In all other elections or referenda conducted, there have been questions raised 
regarding the fairness, transparency and legality of the process. In the case of the 
postponed May 2000 megaelections, the date initially chosen violated the constitution by 
not allowing a six-month period between the approval of it and the elections. The 
opposition claimed the date favored the President, by not allowing them sufficient time to 
organize, obtain enough signatures to register their candidates, and to campaign. In every 
referendum the legality of the question being asked has been called into question. Many 
say that the president is using this referendum mechanism to pass controversial issues to 
fulfill his political revolution. The TSJ has ruled favorably on the constitutionality of all 
referenda thus far. 
Additionally, President Chávez violated many electoral laws by using state 
resources, like his official plane and his weekly radio program, for campaign purposes. 
Many times, the CNE advised him that he was violating laws, but he said that as 
president he was conducting government business. Only one time was he told not to 
conduct his weekly radio program.  In response, President Chávez instead delivered a 
national broadcast television address, and promised to keep delivering TV addresses until 
the elections were over.25 The CNE issued a fine. Chávez’s supporters rapidly 
demonstrated against this and collected the money to pay the fine.   Despite the failure of 
                                                 
25Country Reports- Press Freedom Survey 200- Venezuela from the Freedom House Organization 
accessed online at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2000/reports.html  [3 March 2001]  
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the CNE to stop Chávez, their actions were enough to draw international attention to the 
situation.  After remarks from international observers Chávez “voluntarily” stopped using 
state resources. 
B.  HUMAN RIGHTS  
Human rights violations in Venezuela are not the product of a systematic 
government policy, but there are areas of concern. Since the early 1990s, Venezuela has 
continually been placed on the State Department’s annual human rights report as one of 
the countries with a high number of violations.  The 1999 State Department report 
concluded “the Government’s human rights record continued to be poor in some areas; 
although there were improvements in some others, serious problems remain.”26  
The areas of major concern were extra-judicial killings committed by members of 
the security apparatus, an increase in torture and abuse of detainees, the failure to punish 
police and security forces guilty of these abuses, long delays in trials, and corruption and 
severe inefficiency in the judicial and law enforcement.27 Military courts most often are 
seen as biased in favor of members of the military forces convicted of any violations or 
even human rights abuses. This will be addressed in more detail in chapter five. 
A new Organic Criminal Procedures Code (COPP) went into effect on July 1999, 
but authorities are still struggling to implement it. Although President Chávez’s 
government fired a high number of judges whom it considered corrupt and incompetent, 
the judicial system remains highly inefficient. Most of the crimes cited in the reports are 
                                                 
26 Department of State 1999 Report of Human Rights Practices, released by the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000. Accessed online at: 
http://www.stae.gov./g/drl/rls/1999/wha/index.cfm?docd+835 [1 Mar 2000] 
27 Ibid. 
 25
not the result of indiscriminate acts by the police; two factors have increased this 
numbers. First, unemployment has aggravated crime to very high levels. Second, the 
implementation of the COPP ties the police’s hands, because a criminal cannot be 
brought before a judge until a hearing is scheduled.  Since the judiciary is in such 
disarray, the police just have to cite the criminal and let him free. 28 
Many consider the prison system in Venezuela the worst in all of Latin 
America.29 Conditions are brutal, and many of the killings that take place within the 
prison cells are never investigated, and in most cases not even known. The Venezuelan 
Program of Action and Education in Human Rights (PROVEA), a non-governmental 
human rights organization has documented many of these killings. The President declared 
the prisons to be in a state of emergency, but nothing has been done to solve this 
situation.  
Some accusations of human rights abuses stem from the disaster that occurred in 
Venezuela, coincidentally on the day of the referendum to approve the Constitution, in 
December 1999. The country suffered its worst natural disaster, when heavy rains 
triggered floods and landslides, killing an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 people and causing 
extensive structural damage to coastal towns. The ANC declared a national state of 
emergency and granted the President broad powers to respond to any situation. The 
President ordered members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces (National Guard and 
“Cazador”-Ranger type Battalions) as well as members of the State Security Police 
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(DISIP) into the devastated area to prevent looting.  Witnesses claim that these security 
forces detained and brutally killed alleged looters in Vargas State; the area hit the hardest 
by the mudslides. The OAS human rights commission and other international human 
rights NGOs continue to investigate these alleged human rights abuses by members of the 
state’s security apparatus. 
C. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS    
In Venezuela there are constitutional provisions safeguarding freedom of speech 
and press, and generally the government respects these provisions. However again in this 
area, there have been some constitutional changes and actions by the Chávez government, 
which raise concerns about possible uses of the state apparatus to discourage freedom of 
the press. This section argues that the pressure on the media and on civil society not only 
violates the constitution, but also increases the threats to democracy itself. 
In the new Constitution there is a provision which includes a “truthful information 
clause” that is perceived as a tool that can be used by the government to intimidate the 
press. The Inter-American Press Society (SIP) has said that: “The Constitution of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in its article No. 58 places at risk the rights for 
freedom of speech and expression…”30 The enabling legislation putting this clause into 
effect is contained in Articles 208 and 209 of the new telecommunications law regulating 
the media, which was passed in July 2000. The articles state, “The government has the 
right to restrict any information or cancel programs, which it believes to be not timely, 
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truthful, impartial, and uncensored.”31 This law can be used to limit the press to reporting 
what the government wants them to report. The press and constitutional lawyers claim it 
violates the provisions of the new Constitution. Freedom House expressed concern “that 
the qualifying terms describing information to which the public has a right could allow 
for control based on subjective criteria.”32   
In addition to this new law, there have been other actions by the government that 
have been perceived as intimidation to the press. Two newspapers have closed claiming 
government pressure on their editors.  In another case the editor of “El Mundo”, Teodoro 
Petkoff, resigned because of what he described as “tremendous and belligerent 
government pressure” on the owners of the newspaper. Before the postponed mega 
elections of May 2000, a TV program, “24 Hours”, hosted by Mr. Napoleon Bravo, went 
off the air after steady pressure from the government.33 At the time, Bravo’s wife—
former ANC member Angela Zago—was the spokesperson for the presidential campaign 
of LTC (ret) Francisco Arias Cardenas, Chávez’s main rival in the megaelections. During 
the news conference in which Bravo was denouncing government intimidation, members 
of the State Police (DISIP) were seen inside the hotel where the conference was taking 
place.   
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While campaigning for a “yes” vote for the approval of the constitution in 
November 1999, President Chávez stepped up his campaign against the media. On 
November 28 during the transmission of his radio program “Hello President”, he accused 
Andrés Mata, publisher of Venezuela’s leading newspaper, El Universal, of 
“orchestrating an international campaign against the approval of the constitution, against 
the Bolivarian revolution, against the majority of Venezuelans, and against social justice 
and progress…”34 Other newspapers have also felt the pressure from the state 
intelligence apparatus. The weekly newspaper, “La Razón”, has been under direct 
observation and pressure from the security police since it wrote about alleged corruption 
cases within the Chávez government. (Interestingly enough, when Chávez was first 
released from prison and was interested in writing a weekly column, “La Razón” was the 
only paper, which would take his writings. During the presidential campaign of 1998, “La 
Razón” became the official newspaper of Chávez’s party, the Movimiento V Republica). 
The Inter-American Human Rights Commission (CIDH), an OAS human rights 
watchdog, 35 has ruled in favor of “La Razón” on several of the accusations introduced by 
human rights non-governmental organizations that the government violated civil liberties.  
Although there is no official censure of any media organizations, the president 
denounces the press in almost every speech he gives. In his fiery and often intimidating 
rhetoric he calls them “anti-social ” tools of the corrupt and rotten elites that did so much 
harm to Venezuela prior to his presidency. He accuses them of organizing an 
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international campaign against him, financed by international groups, and threatens to 
expose them in the public opinion. In response to their criticisms of the constitution’s 
“truthful information clause”, President Chávez has called the members of the SIP “liars, 
irresponsible, obtuse, superficial and full of complexes¼”36 Even international news 
organizations have been the target of President Chávez’s verbal attacks. For example, in 
August he accused The New York Times of “publishing gigantic lies in an August 21 
editorial that called him a ‘potentate’ who sought to concentrate power in the 
presidency.”37  
The use of the state security and intelligence apparatus to intimidate those who 
might criticize the government extends to the Catholic Church as well.  Initially, while 
the ANC was debating controversial articles prior to the approval of the new constitution, 
President Chávez and members of his cabinet, specifically those of State, Interior and 
Defense, responded to the Catholic Church’s comments on the controversial articles with 
a fiery verbal “barrage”. In addition, members of the state intelligence police (DISIP) 
“visited” the diocese’s radio station. Right before the postponed elections, Monsignor 
Baltazar Porras, the President of the Episcopal Conference of Venezuela, spoke out about 
how the Church did not think the election process was being conducted in a “free, free 
and transparent” manner. As a result of the Monsignor’s comments, the President and 
government officials launched a vicious verbal attack. The president called the 
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Monsignor an “Adeco with a cassock”38 and accused him “of teaming up with the 
devil.”39 Once again, agents from the DISIP visited, photographing and videotaping the 
Monsignor’s Sunday mass. These actions and intimidating verbal attacks against 
members of the Catholic Church have preoccupied many. 
The latest incident that has caused furor amongst human rights advocates is the 
detention and imprisonment of a law professor who wrote an article in the local 
newspaper insulting the armed forces. He was arrested by armed police and was charged 
under military law with insulting the Armed Forces, a charge that under the Military 
Justice Code carries a jail sentence of three to eight years. Human rights organizations 
say this arrest violates not only the writer’s human rights but also the articles in the new 
constitution as well as international press agreements Venezuela has signed.40 This 
incident of civilians being charged under military law will be addressed in chapter five. 
D. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
Although the Venezuelan constitution safeguards freedom of association, calling 
it “essential,” the Chávez government has repeatedly violated this basic right. In response 
to an executive request for a ruling on the meaning of civil society] the Supreme Justice 
Tribunal issued the following declaration in November 2000:“First, nongovernmental 
organizations that receive funding from foreign governments or whose leaders are not 
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Venezuelan are not part of civil society, and therefore may not represent Venezuelan 
citizens in court or bring their own lega l actions. Second, religious organizations are not 
part of civil society, and are subject to the same restriction as those defined for civil 
society. And third, the government has an obligation to ensure that NGOs are ‘democratic 
in nature’, therefore their internal elections (such as board of directors) can be regulated 
by the. The National Electoral Council (CNE).”41 Larry Diamond in his book, 
Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation, defines Civil Society as “the realm of 
organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-
supporting, autonomous form the sate and bound by a legal order or set of shared 
rules.”42 Additionally, he notes one key feature for civil society is to “formally governs it 
own internal affairs. To what extent does it practice democratic principles of 
constitutionalism, transparency, accountability, participation, deliberation, representation 
and rotation of leaders.”43  The ruling by the TSJ clearly violates the autonomy and 
independence by civil society from the state and depicts state involvement in civil society 
organizations. In contrast, President Chavez has utilized constitutional rulings, these 
particular TSJ decree and referenda to limit the right of association and to favor its own 
government organizations such as the Bolivarian Women Force (FBM), Bolivarian 
Students Front (FBE), amongst others to rally support to his political project. 
One example of the government’s attempt to restrict association is its referendum 
calling for the “democratization” of labor unions. For many years the organized labor 
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unions of Venezuela have operated under an “umbrella” union, the Venezuelan 
Confederation of Workers (CTV). The CTV played a vital role when democracy 
triumphed over the dictatorship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez in January 1958. The 
leadership and core of the CTV is still in its large majority the electoral base of the two 
traditional parties in Venezuela, Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI, the Social 
Christian Democratic Party. President Chávez has often called the CTV “the last bastion 
of the corrupt elites” that stole from Venezuela and lied to the workers for over 40 
years44.  He threatens the CTV that he will launch a missile against them, and destroy 
them from their foundations 45. 
In order to organize a labor union loyal to the government, President Chávez 
formed the Bolivarian Workers Force (FBT) and called for a national referendum to 
“democratize” labor unions. Against an outcry of protest not only from the existing labor 
unions but civil society, a referendum was held asking the population: “are you in favor 
of suspending the leadership of all labor unions for a period of 180 days and for the 
calling of elections?”46 The CTV and other organizations protested that this is in 
violation of constitutional articles of freedom of organization as well as many of the 
international agreements Venezuela has signed over the years. The International Labor 
Organization  (ILO) agreed with the CTV’s protests and issued a stern declaration against 
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the referendum, threatening a massive boycott of all products coming from or going to 
Venezuela47.  Additionally, Bill Jordan, Secretary General of the International 
Confederation of Free Labor Unions (CIOSL) warned that if Venezuela went ahead with 
this referendum it could risk losing credits from the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Inter-American Development Bank (BID), because they all 
have clauses requiring compliance with ILO agreements.48 President Chávez accused 
these international organizations “…of being ridiculous, and being allies with the most 
powerful and corrupt sectors in the world. I challenge you to boycott Venezuela, if you 
can…”49 The Supreme Justice Tribunal (TSJ) ruled the referendum constitutional and 
gave the green light for it to be held in conjunction with mayoral elections in December 
2000.  
The constitution does not specify any particular percentage to win approval on 
referendums. The referendum was approved, with over 69% of the vote, but the high 
absenteeism (over 79%), gave critics and opposers of Chávez the necessary ammunition 
to call this “ the first major political and electoral defeat of president Chávez.”50 Even 
President Chávez’s political mentor and leader of the MVR, Luis Miquelena, 
acknowledged that the turnout was not as high as they had hoped, but attributed it to lack 
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of interest in the accompanying election of mayors.51 The president had campaigned hard 
for the approval of the referendum, but after the results came in, he hardly commented on 
the results or the high percent of absenteeism. After the referendum the leadership of the 
CTV resigned, but the worker bases continue to support the organization and have 
obeyed every call for labor stoppages. The FBT does not have a sufficient organized 
worker base or a strong enough leadership to defeat the CTV in open worker elections.52  
This less-than-resounding referendum result and great pressure from the ILO have 
led to negotiations between the government backed FBT and the CTV to conduct 
elections in the existing labor unions. However, it is not clear how this negotiations will 
fare since the FBT is not well organized enough to challenge the CTV in internal 
elections.53  The issue was not to hold elections, but to allow the entire electoral 
population to interfere in the internal matters of the Labor Unions, by answering the 
referendum question. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter closely examined some of the areas in which there are concerns for 
democracy in Venezuela: elections, human rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of 
organization. It advanced the thesis that the Chávez political revolution is in fact creating 
certain deterioration to those essential principles of democracy. The rush to hold elections 
in violation of the constitution, the lack of representativeness of the electoral 
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commissions and their seemingly partisan behavior, intense pressure on the media, 
continuous verbal attacks from the president against anyone who dares to criticize him 
and his efforts to control civil society and centralize participation under a governmental 
umbrella, all represent challenges to the respect for civil liberties at the heart of a liberal 
democracy.  This evidence puts in question whether President Chavez’s government even 
meets the minimum conditions of an electoral democracy. 
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As promised in his election campaign in 1998, President Chávez convened a 
National Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly had a clear mandate from an 
electoral majority to rewrite the country’s constitution. President Chávez challenged them 
to write it in 90 days and to eradicate the power of the traditional parties, eliminate 
corruption and attend to the needs of the poor. 
This chapter examines the Bolivarian constitution and the extent to which it 
affects the role-played by the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It will also 
examine the two new branches created under the constitution: the “moral” branch and the 
“electoral” branch of government. It will assess to what extent these four branches 
function independently to provide the checks and balances to constrain the executive and 
the autonomous power of the other branches.  This notion of horizontal accountability 
through checks and balances is absent from electoral definitions of democracy but it is a 
key component of liberal democracy. Chavez’s participative vision of democracy, like 
delegative democracy, tends to reject legislative and judicial checks to the extent they 
prevent the executive from fulfilling his mandate to the people.  However, Chavez’s 
vision, unlike delegative democracy, creates new branches of government representing 
the people and increasing, in theory, their ability to provide checks on the president.   
A. THE BOLIVARIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1999 
Throughout his electoral campaign Hugo Chávez Frias insisted that the main 
instrument to root out the endemic corruption caused by the two-party system was a 
National Constituent Assembly (ANC) with a clear mandate to write a new constitution. 
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On inauguration day, he declined to swear faith and allegiance to the existing 
constitution; instead, he vowed to replace “¼ this dying constitution¼”54. During the 
opening moments of his inaugural speech he stated “ The constitution and with it the ill-
fated political system to which it gave birth 40 years ago has to die: it is going to die, sirs, 
accept it¼There will be no backtracking in the political revolution upon which we are 
embarking¼”55. Additionally, during the speech he convoked the referendum for the 
formation of the National Constituent Assembly in direct violation of the 1961 
constitution.  Later, Chávez’s Polo Patriótico (PP) obtained an overwhelming majority in 
the elections for the Assembly. This majority included long-time loyal followers, 
including his wife, Marisabel, his brother, Adan, 20 retired Army officers (all of whom 
participated with president Chávez in the 1992 coups), and a variety of lawyers, 
journalists and aged leftist guerillas.56  
President Chávez then introduced a draft Constitutional project that was to be 
used as a base for deliberation by the members of the Constituent Assembly. Despite his 
long trips abroad, President Chávez was involved, mostly behind closed doors, in the 
drafting of the new constitution. Some of the most controversial articles, which the 
Assembly had initially rejected, were put back in at the insistence of the president during 
the final deliberating process. (Additional changes were also surreptitiously introduced 
during an editing process meant to correct syntax errors, after the referendum on the 
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constitution, thus altering the substance of the text approved by the people.)  In many 
ways the new Constitution resembles the “old” one, with the exception of some 
controversial articles, which increase state intervention in the economy, reduce civilian 
control of the military, and centralize power in the person of the President.  
This constitution was approved by referendum on 15 December 1999 amidst the 
worst natural disaster that has ever hit the country and became the 26th constitution since 
Venezuela’s independence. Although absenteeism was high at 54%, 70% voted for 
approval of the document and 29% rejected it. As has been the case in other elections, 
opposition to the constitution mostly came from those who had voted against Chávez in 
the presidential elections, supporters of the two traditional parties, AD and COPEI. But 
there was also opposition from other sectors of society. There was some vocal opposition 
from the Roman Catholic Church, which immediately became the target of the 
president’s fiery speeches. Also, economic groups including the influential Venezuelan-
American Chamber of Commerce (VENAMCHAM) expressed skepticism about the 
implementation of the economic reforms contained in the constitution. 57  
Many argue that the new constitution centralizes power in the hands of the 
president. The constitution, said Chávez, is the “blueprint for the foundation of the fifth 
republic,”58 but many dispute this fact and argue that it provides the basis for a 
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“constitutional dictatorship.”59 Anibal Romero, a political science professor at the Simon 
Bolivar Central University of Venezuela, stated” we’re seeing the personalization of 
power¼ we now have a government of one man—not of laws or parties.”60 With the 
approval of the constitution President Chávez had the legal document to complete his 
political project and overhaul the political system in Venezuela. 
The key to how much impact the Bolivarian constitution will have in Chávez’s 
revolution or on the future of Venezuela lies in the writing of the laws that accompany 
the articles approved61 and in their implementation. The media and most critics believe 
that the constitution is too vague and its interpretation will come down to how the 
governmental branches controlled by the executive, or the president himself, interpret the 
laws.  The following sections discuss the constitutional changes and show how the 
president and his allies have interpreted them since their introduction. The chapter 
concludes with an overall assessment of the state of checks and balances under Chávez 
and the new Constitution in Venezuela.  
B. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 
In the past Venezuela had a weak presidential system, replaced every five years, 
and limited to only one term. The new constitution concentrates power in the executive 
branch through articles extending the presidential period from five to six years with the 
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opportunity to be reelected; giving the executive the power to dissolve the National 
Assembly if it rejects his selection of a vice-president, and permitting the president to 
declare an state of exception and govern by decree on a broad range of matters. In 
contrast to this centralization, the constitution includes articles providing for the president 
to be evaluated by way of a popular referendum when he completes one half of his 
mandate.  
The new constitution creates what it calls a “semi-presidentialist” system, by 
creating a position of executive Vice-president and permitting the president to dissolve 
the assembly if his choice for Vice president is rejected three times. The figure of the 
Vice-president goes beyond that of the traditional United States Vice presidential roles.   
According to the constitution, the Vice president shares power with the president.62 Some 
of his functions are to act as the conduit for the federal government to state governors, to 
serve as the voice of the executive in the national Assembly, and to advise the president 
in the elaboration of executive policies to govern the country.  So far, the vice president 
has not had much of an impact in the method of governance or on the power of the 
president.  
Because the constitution allows the president to dissolve the legislature and to 
govern by decree, many argue “there is a disturbing degree of centralization and 
concentration of powers in the constitution.”63 Hermann Escarrá, a leading constitutional 
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lawyer and member of the ANC, which wrote the constitution, argues, “It is disturbing 
that the President can dissolve4 the Legislative branch… it is a dangerous faculty, it 
translates almost as establishing a constitutional dictatorship.”64  
Additionally, the new constitution allows extensive enabling laws to be approved 
by the National Assembly (AN) These laws can give the executive decree authority to 
rule in a wide range of areas (under previous constitutions decree power was limited to 
economic issues). The National Assembly passed this very broad enabling law in 
September 2000.  
President Chávez has chosen not to appoint many members of his party to the 
cabinet and his inner circle, but rather to give most of the positions to those personally 
loyal to him, many of whom participated with him in the 1992 coup. Many are retired or 
active duty members of the military. Three of the nine cabinet level ministries have an 
active duty General Officer as the Minister, two more have retired military officers, in the 
rest either the deputy or high- level officials are active duty or retired military officers. 
The rest of the executive level institutions and state companies show the same matrix of 
military participation.  Personal loyalty and the military chain of command mean that 
there are few critical voices within the government to provide a check on Chávez’s 
power. 
Chávez’s centralized leadership style is also evident  in his personal involvement 
in the drafting of the constitution.  One of the central debates in that process was over 
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changing the name of the country from Republic of Venezuela to the Bolivarean 
Republic of Venezuela. There was large opposition to this name change, but Chávez 
insisted on the change, and in the end it was reintroduced into the constitution, along with 
a number of other changes rejected by the assembly but personally endorsed by Chávez.  
President Chávez’s personalistic leadership style, the broad powers given to him 
by the constitution and an executive branch of government completely loyal to him and 
his project, make this a very strong branch of government. 
C. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 
Chávez’s behavior toward the legislature since assuming office, constitutional 
changes to the role of the legislature, and the composition of the new Assembly all call 
into question whether or not the legislature will be willing and able to act as an 
autonomous check on Chávez’s power.  
Upon assuming the presidency, Chávez showed disregard for the sitting 
legislature. Until the new constitution being written by the National Constituent 
Assembly (ANC) was approved by referendum, the existing bicameral Congress was to 
continue its functions as the legislative branch of government.  However, President 
Chávez declared, that the ANC was “original” in its character and had much broader 
powers than just the drafting of the constitution.  In particular, Chávez claimed that the 
ANC should supplant the ordinary legislative role of the existing Congress and even be 
given powers superior to those of the Congress. This act almost created a constitutional 
crisis before the constitutional process even began. The Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) 
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dissolved itself, fearing an ANC take over, and was replaced by a temporary Supreme 
Justice Tribunal (TSJ), which consisted of the alternate members of the dissolved CSJ.   
At the same time the existing congress ceased its functions to prevent Chávez 
from declaring an executive emergency that would allow him to dissolve congress and 
rule by decree.65 The interim TSJ ruled in favor of president Chávez’s “original 
character” petition for the ANC. This allowed the Constituent Assembly to take over all 
legislative functions until its mandate expired in February 2000. A transitional power was 
to continue to legislate until such time a permanent body was elected.  In describing this 
incident, Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, D.C., 
wrote, “There are reasons to be concerned about Chávez’s commitment to democracy. 
His rhetoric is bombastic and intimidating. He’s shown disdain for Congress and the 
courts ¼”66 
The principal constitutional changes affecting the role and functions of the 
legislative branch of government are the substitution of a bicameral legislature 
(consisting of a congress and senate) with a unicameral National Assembly, and the 
removal of legislative authority over military promotions. The unicameral structure of the 
legislature responds to the need to simplify procedures to draft laws, reduce expenditures, 
and eradicate duplication in administrative procedures. As a means of checks of balances, 
bicameral legislatures are generally more effective. If the congress is composed of two 
houses, the senate usually provides a check on the lower house, either because its 
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members are elected on a different basis than the lower house or because elections are 
staggered to maintain continuity and prevent the entire legislature composition from 
being affected by temporary shifts in public opinion.  
In the elections, the official coalition, Polo Patriótico, an alliance between the 
Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), obtained 
just over 60% of the seats in the Assembly (MVR ho lds 93 of the 160 seats and the MAS 
6).67  Unexpectedly the second political force in the current National Assembly, the party 
which everyone considered to be “dead’, was Acción Democrática (AD), with almost 
20% of the seats (32 of 160). With over 60% majority, President Chávez and his coalition 
can easily pass legislation strictly on a party line vote. President Chavez’s coalition has 
been able to get the two-thirds (66.6%), which the constitution declares necessary to pass 
the enabling law and control nominations 68(the presidential enabling law encompasses 
80% of the laws). Although small, it s opens up spaces that if taken advantage by the 
opposition, could become a factor in providing checks and balances or block passage to 
some laws that will be debated in the Assembly.    
The National Assembly has its job cut out to debate and pass a large number of 
laws that emanate from the new constitution. Until now, the only significant law they 
have approved is the enabling law, giving Chávez broad decree authority.  They have also 
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had to make a decision on how the members of the moral and electoral branches of 
government and magistrates for the new TSJ were to be selected, since this was not 
clearly specified in the constitution. This created a big controversy and debate amongst 
opposition members of the National Assembly as to the involvement of civil society in 
the selection process. Members of a new party called Primero Justicia (PJ) were 
instrumental in this debate. Some of the members of this party are well-versed 
constitutional lawyers, who advocated an active participation of society in the nomination 
of moral branch members and an improvement in the process for choosing the 
magistrates. In the end, the official coalition nominated the candidates for the moral 
branch and the National Assembly voted on them. For the magistrates, the Justice 
Commission of the ANC reviewed the applications of the candidates and selected them in 
a closed-door process, rejecting the constitutional interpretation advanced by Primero 
Justicia (PJ). The practice of selecting the members of these branches, by Chavez’s led 
majority in the National Assembly, clearly does not live up to his participative vision by 
denying civil society any role in the nominations.  
D. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 
The judicial system in Venezuela has been criticized as one of the most corrupt in 
Latin America. Since his election, President Chávez took an aggressive attitude towards 
the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ), not only opposing every ruling or statement they 
made, but threatening to shut them down altogether.  President’s Chávez disdain for the 
traditional Supreme Court and the manner in which the new Supreme Justice Tribunal 
was selected call into doubt the ability of this branch of government to act autonomously. 
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When Chávez declared the original character of the ANC to exercise powers 
above their mandate to write the constitution, the ANC declared a judicial emergency and 
created an emergency commission. This commission stated, “ We declare the jud icial 
branch of government in a state of emergency and reorganization. Our intent is to bring 
dignity to the judicial system, restore credibility and trust from the populace, design a fair 
system to assure transparency, independence and autonomy to individual judges, respect 
individual rights and respect the rule of law.”69 Following this ANC declaration, the 
Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) dissolved itself. Dr. Cecilia Sosa, the president of the 
CSJ, lamented the disintegration of the court by saying “The court simply committed 
suicide to avoid being assassinated. The result is the same- it is dead.”70 
An interim Supreme Judicial Tribunal (TSJ) was appointed by the emergency 
commission of the ANC to substitute the Supreme Judicial Court (CSJ) after its 
dissolution. The “temporary” Judicial Tribunal, which was filled with alternate members 
from the CSJ, took over the judicial branch of government until a permanent body was 
selected under the new constitution. When the time came to appoint the TSJ’s permanent 
members, the Justice Commission of the National Assembly ratified most of the 
magistrates in their positions in a closed-door process. A member of president Chávez’s 
coalition leads this commission and the Polo Patriotico dominates the commission. 
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The executive called on this “temporary” Judicial Tribunal to make some 
unprecedented decisions dealing mainly with the electoral processes and abuses thereof. 
The most well known decision was the postponement of the “megaelections” scheduled 
for 28 May 2000. That decision was the only time the TSJ has ruled against what seemed 
to be the will of the executive or other branches of government. Since then the TSJ, both 
the temporary body and the one selected by the National Assembly, has had to rule on the 
constitutional legality of every referendum, the legality of wording of the questions asked 
in those referenda, and in other actions by the executive.  Although the majority of these 
petitions questioning the constitutionality of referenda and other acts were introduced by 
civil society organizations, the moral and electoral branches have also submitted petitions 
in an effort to check the power of the president. In all but the postponement of the 
elections the courts have ruled for the executive.  
E. THE MORAL AND ELECTORAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT 
Hugo Chávez Frias has always believed that the classical scheme of governmental 
divisions of power (executive, legislative and judicial) contained in all liberal 
democracies is insufficient.71 On Chávez’s insistence, the approved constitution 
established two new branches of power: the moral and electoral branches. These two 
autonomous branches are key to president Chávez’s vision of participative democracy. 
The moral branch, also known as the “people’s” branch is inspired by constitutional ideas 
expressed by Simon Bolivar during the 1819 Angostura Congress, which led to 
Venezuela’s first constitution. (Bolivar’s ideas were not approved during that constituent 
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process.)72 The moral branch would consist of a triumvirate formed by the Attorney 
General, the Comptroller General, and the head of a new institution, the public 
Ombudsman. Their functions would be to listen to people’s complaints and investigate 
abuses of power and corruption, including human rights violations. The moral branch, 
Chávez stated vehemently, “Must be completely autonomous and it cannot be 
subordinated to any other branch of government.”73 
The other branch created under the 1999 constitution is the electoral branch, 
based on Bolivar’s ideas, which had been introduced in the 1826 constitution of Bolivia. 
This branch will consider everything relating to the increased number of electoral 
processes permitted by the new constitution, such as referenda, initiatives and recalls. 
As President Chávez wrote in his draft constitutional document, “An autonomous 
electoral branch assures us principles of legitimacy and representativeness.”74 The CNE 
has never been a separate branch under previous governments. President Chávez elevates 
it to a separate autonomous branch as part of his model of participative democracy in 
which the direct participation of the people in governing is central.   
President Chávez appointed people he thought would be sympathetic to his 
project to the moral branch.  For example, he chose Javier Elechequeirra, who defended 
him while he was in prison for the position of Attorney General. He acted independently 
in the investigation of corruption cases against members of Chávez’s government, a 






move that caused him to be under fire by the executive for lack of loyalty. The corruption 
allegations were brought up initially by Chávez’s fellow coup leader and at the time, 
director of the state intelligence police, Jesús Urdaneta Hernandez. The Attorney General 
and other members of the moral branch investigated most allegations and found sufficient 
evidence to bring the Minister of Interior and Justice, Luis Miquelena, leader of MVR 
and Chávez’s political mentor, to a hearing in front of the TSJ. (Miquelena has recently 
been named again Minister of Interior and Justice, by president Chávez).  After listening 
to both sides, the TSJ ruled against the Attorney General and in favor of Miquelena’s 
position, exonerating him of all corruption allegations. In sum, the Attorney General, who 
in Chavez’s participative vision of democracy is supposed to represent and defend the 
citizens, has been willing to act independently of the executive, but has not been an 
effective check because other branches of government have opposed him. 
The MVR-led majority in the National Assembly initially selected all the electoral 
branch members, with no representation from other parties in it. The members of the 
CNE then dismissed key personnel to replace them with loyalists. The members of the 
CNE all resigned after their incompetence led to the postponement of the megaelections 
in May 2000. The National Assembly again selected a second CNE but, as described 
earlier, there was more participation by NGOs, civil society and the media in the 
selection process. The majority of the second CNE resigned prior to the Labor Unions 
referendum. Two of them resigned to return to private life, while two of them resigned 
claiming executive interference with their functions.    
President Chávez and his party dominated the appointment processes to the moral 
and electoral branches, designating party members and other people sympathetic to the 
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government project to the posts.  On occasions, the appointees acted in a partisan matter 
that called into question the autonomy of these branches from the executive (e.g., 
investigating alleged corruption within the government, introduction injunctions for 
suspension of referenda, etc.  On other occasions, despite their predisposition toward 
Chávez, members of the moral and electoral branches found it necessary to challenge 
him.  These independent efforts were largely ineffectual. The moral branch in acted 
independently in investigating corruption allegations and members of the electoral branch 
resigned over the labor union referendum rather than oppose Chávez directly  
This chapter examined the roles and functions of each branch of government and 
evaluated the extent to which President Chávez or his political party (MVR) controls 
each of the branches of government. In the executive branch, constitutional articles 
centralize power in the president by extending his term and allowing reelection, the 
dissolution of the National Assembly, and broad decree authority. In the legislative 
branch, the MVR majority has delegated extensive power to the president. The autonomy 
and independence of the judiciary is called into doubt by the manner in which the 
members of the TSJ were selected, their repeated rulings in favor of the executive, and 
the level of corruption that exists in the judicial system, Also the autonomy and 
independence of the Moral branch is questioned when a partisan majority in the National 
Assembly denies civil society a vital role in the nomination process, and selects long time 
loyal activists to fill the positions. The CNE’s independence is questionable, because a 
partisan majority also made their selection and because it is not clear if they will act 
transparently, because there is no representation from other parties, in the enforcement 
event of contested elections,  
 52
President Chávez’s disregard for the independent and autonomous functions of 
these branches is inconsistent with the models of democracy advanced in this thesis.  It is 
not inconsistent with the minimal notion of an electoral democracy, since elections are 
held periodically.  The disregard for horizontal accountability clearly violates the more 
expansive definition of liberal democracy, but is consistent with models of delegative 
democracy. It matches his own vision of participative democracy by creating two 
additional branches of government, which represent the people and assign them the role 
of providing checks on the government.  However, it violates it by denying n civil 
society’s participation if the selection of the two branches created exactly for that purpose 
to represent the people. 
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Venezuela has always been considered a sound consolidated democracy in Latin 
America. The military has been subordinated to civilian authorities since the mid 1960s, 
and has not acted in the political and social arenas since the military dictatorship of 
General Marcos Perez Jimenez was overthrown in 1958. This began to change when the 
military was used to repress widespread looting in Caracas (the  “Caracazo”) in February 
of 1989 and when sectors of the military attempted coups in February and November 
1992.   However, even during those grim hours for democratic Venezuela, the military’s 
“instituitionalists” did not permit the “radical” coup plotters to subvert civilian rule. The 
military continued its loyal subordination to civilian leaders, even though these 
governments had led Venezuela to very tough years, economically and socially.  
However, all of this has changed since President Chávez took office in February 
1999. He has steadily been “militarizing” society, politics and government, giving a more 
active role to members of the Armed Forces in each of these three arenas. President 
Chávez in his governmental agenda calls for a fusion between the Armed Forces and the 
people as the key to combat all the problems Venezuela has had for over 40 years and to 
care for its own citizens.75 As President Chávez often says, “I will govern Venezuela, 
with one hand in the streets and the other in the Army Bases”76 The quote illustrates the 
nature of President Chávez’s government as a fusion between military and civilians. 
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Anibal Romero a professor at the Simon Bolivar University states, “we are going down a 
very dangerous path. The new president is military populist”77 Some other critics argue 
that “President Chávez’s actions send the wrong message at a time when Latin America’s 
fragile democracies are struggling to keep the military in their barracks and out of 
politics.”78 Michael Shifter, a senior fellow at the Inter- American Dialogue a think tank 
in Washington, D.C. refers to Chávez’s actions as “an invitation to greater politicization 
of the military, which is precisely what led to some of the worst aspects of the 
authoritarian period in Latin America.”79 
This chapter details the changes in the role of the military in Venezuela since 
President Chávez’s rise to power. It uses Alfred Stepan’s definition of military 
prerogatives to assess the changes in the military’s position. Stepan defines the dimension 
of military institutional prerogatives as  “ those areas where, whether challenged or not, 
the military as an institut ion assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or 
informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within 
extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between 
the state and political or civil society.”80 The chapter evaluates the military role within 
the state apparatus (both the executive and judiciary), in politics, in society, and in its 
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own internal governance.  By utilizing the Armed Forces in his political project, Chávez 
is damaging a long tradition of democracy and civil-military relations. The chapter 
concludes by evaluating the potential threat this "militarization" poses to other countries 
in the region. 
A. THE MILITARY IN GOVERNMENT 
In most democracies, presidents appoint technocrats or faithful party members to 
their cabinets and other state positions. In President Chávez’s case, his political party and 
inner circle is comprised largely of military members. President Chávez has used active 
and retired members of the Armed Forces to fill most key positions in the cabinet and 
other important state enterprises.  
Because President Chávez does not come from any of the traditional parties that 
governed Venezuela, he has relied on active duty and retired military officers to run the 
government, appointing over 50 of them to key positions.  Most of the retired members 
were direct participants, with Chávez, in the 1992 coups (many were originally members 
of the Movimiento Bolivareano Revolucionario 200). In three of nine  cabinet ministries 
there is an active duty military officer, in the other six the deputy is retired or active duty 
military. Also there are military members in key government agencies such as the Central 
Budget Office; the state-run oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and its U.S. 
subsidiary, CITGO; and the Venezuelan Corporation of Guyana (CVG), which includes 
the state Aluminum and Energy Companies (ALCASA and SIDOR). 
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Coming from a military and not a political background it was almost logical for 
President Chávez to rely in his trusted friends in the military. President Chávez knows the 
Armed Forces and their capabilities better than any other institution. Chavez and much of 
the population believe that traditional politicians are corrupt and responsible for most of 
Venezuela’s problems. In contrast, the people recognize the Armed Forces as a trusted, 
disciplined institution. Despite the 1992 coup attempts and corruption scandals in 1994 
and 1995, the military is still considered one of the most trusted institutions in 
Venezuela.81  
There are a number of problems with relying mostly on military members to 
govern. It creates dissatisfaction amongst able civilians and within the military about the 
basis for government appointments. Many argue that becoming a member of government 
is no longer in the form of meritocracy, but of loyalty and membership in the armed 
forces. More importantly, if the executive issues a directive, because of the verticality of 
the chain of command in the military, it would be almost considered an order issued by 
the Commander in Chief. In any case, if the active duty military member opposes, it can 
be considered treason. Most importantly, is the question of whether democracy can 
“coexist with the militarization of civilian institutions?”82 Michael Shifter stated, “Latin 
America should have learned by now, and most countries have, that military governments 
are not the answer.”83 
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1. The Military and the Justice System 
As in many other countries in Latin America, in Venezuela Organic Law of the 
Armed Forces (LOFAN) and the Military Code of Justice (MCJ) contain articles giving 
military courts jurisdiction over crimes committed by military personnel. Likewise, 
military courts also have jurisdiction over crimes committed by civilians but seen as 
crimes against the military.  This situation can lead to impunity for crimes committed by 
military personnel and the violation of the civil rights of civilians by military courts. 
The members of the military that were accused of committing human rights 
violations during the floods in Vargas state in December 1999 were indicted but have 
never been brought to justice. The military along with the DISIP have used every kind of 
delay tactic and bureaucratic scheme to obstruct the investigations of these crimes by 
human rights nongovernmental organizations and the moral branch of government.84 In 
January 2000, Professor Pablo Aure, a law professor at the University of Valencia, wrote 
a letter to El Nacional a leading newspaper in Venezuela in which he called the armed 
forces “castrated and servile” and criticized military leaders for “their servitude and for 
accepting with nods everything President Chávez assigns them.”85 Armed intelligence 
agents arrested Aure at his home and took him to a military prison where he spent the 
night under heavy interrogation. Aure, a civilian, has been charged under military law 
with insulting the armed forces, a crime that under the Military Criminal Code of Justice 
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can carry up to 8 years in military prison. 86  Former MOD Eliécer Hurtado, said, “What 
this man wrote was not criticism, it was an insult.”87 Aure and leading human rights 
NGOs accused the military of violating the professor’s human rights. Members of the 
moral branch of government are investigating all accusations. The charges are still 
pending. Unless the Supreme Justice Tribunal (TSJ) rules that the Military Code of 
Justice conflicts with the interpretation of the constitution, Aure will be court-martialed88 
and most likely convicted. 
Military authorities also possess jurisdiction over civilians in the two Theaters of 
Operations (TOs) that the military operates along the borders with Colombia to prevent 
the spill over of conflict from Colombia’s internal conflict. The military is responsible for 
internal security in these areas and thus plays the role of both police and judge.  Judicial 
authority lies with the military commander and applies to all civilians for any act against 
the law committed there.  
B. THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 
The ANC and 1999 constitution have changed regulations that govern the 
political roles and functions of military personnel and the military institution. The 
LOFAN prohibits military personnel from active involvement in political activity and 
running for or holding political office, but departs from previous legislation by granting 
the members of the Armed Forces the right to vote. It also takes away from previous 
constitutions the language dealing with the military being apolitical and non-deliberative. 
                                                 




Another very difficult issue, approved by the Chávez- led majority in the National 
Constituent Assembly (ANC), is the reinsertion of the participants in the 1992 coups into 
the Armed Forces.89 This could eventually bring internal division with the non-coup 
participating members. This section examines these articles of the new constitution and 
determines if they affect the traditionally established civil-military relations in 
Venezuela.   
1. Military Participation In Elections  
Article 328 of the new “Bolivarian” Constitution reads as follows: “Active duty 
members of the Armed Forces have the right to vote, according to established electoral 
laws…”90 Some harsh critics of this article feel that “the military vote is one of the last 
steps to convert the Army into an active political force and into the true political party of 
Chávez.”91 Other observers feel that the Armed forces lack the maturity to vote and that 
it could tarnish the transparency of the election process.92 Although military personnel 
have the right to vote in many democracies, this “newness” of this right in Venezuela 
raises many unanswered questions. How can politicians be prevented from conducting 
political activities in military bases? While the constitution article additionally provides 
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regulations and laws prohibiting military personnel from running or holding political 
office and forbidding political parties activities in military bases, it is not clear that these 
regulations are being obeyed.  
During the last presidential campaign there were some “gray” incidents that 
illustrate how easy it is for an official candidate (especially if he comes from within the 
ranks) to conduct political activism in the military bases. A number of incidents 
demonstrate this point.  President Chávez (now also Professor Chávez), teaches Military 
Ethics to the fifth year seniors (voting age citizens), behind close doors at the Venezuelan 
Army Military Academy. Some observers say he is using his classes to do political 
campaigning within the military institution. 93 He is also said to have used tactical and 
garrison commanders to conduct polls within military bases to gauge support for his 
presidency (sensing sessions).94  These examples show that by utilizing the power of the 
official or presidential pulpit, it would be very easy to conduct political activity within 
the military, something that would not be permitted to opposition parties.  The former 
MOD, General Raul Salazar, vowed to uphold the armed forces’ respect for civilian rule 
and laws, stating “Bring me one officer who inscribes himself in a political party and I 
will personally remove him.”95 But yet, when the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) 
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nominated two active duty Colonels as candidates for state governorships, the MOD 
rapidly expedited their resignations for the armed forces to “comply” with the laws of no 
active duty running for office or affiliating to political parties. 
The division and controversy engendered within the Armed Forces in the last 
presidential elections shows how even retired military candidates can contribute to the 
politicization of the military. The two leading candidates in the presidential elections in 
the summer of 2000 were the former coup leaders, President Chávez and Francisco Arias 
Cardenas. This led to a division within the Armed Forces between the “Chavistas” and 
the “Arianos” that reinforced the coup- inspired division between the rebels and the 
institutionalists. The impact that the election has had on civil military relations is great. 
By involving the military in the political debate, a division inside the armed forces has 
inevitably occurred. Within the Armed Forces there are those that support the 
government and those that oppose it. This is dangerous for the future of democracy in 
Venezuela. 
Two other articles in the new constitution undermine the non-partisan role the 
military should play in a democracy.  One article eliminates language that assigns the 
military the duty of defending the constitution and democratic institutions. 96  The other 
article eliminates the language, which appeared in previous constitutions, that defines the 
role of the armed forces as apolitical and non-deliberative. This leads to the interpretation 
that this constitution permits members of the military a more active and political role and 
to criticize the government in public.  Since this constitution was approved in December 
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1999, three different members of the armed forces have publicly criticized the president’s 
actions and the role of the armed forces. All three were immediately arrested and 
eventually removed from the armed forces. The actions taken against these members, 
shows that this article is not to be interpreted as permitting criticism of the government. 
In contrast two General Officers who called for more  “revolution” in public, and were 
rewarded by being given better assignments 
2. The Legacy of the Coup  
The reintegration of coup participants in to the Armed Force, although not a 
constitutional article, was decreed by the Constituent Assembly. This action not only 
exacerbates divisions within the Venezuelan Armed Forces, but it also sends a very bad 
signal about the legitimacy of coups. There have been several reintegrations of coup 
participants since this was determined by the ANC.  At a military ceremony, President 
Chávez called those he was reintegrating “patriots and anonymous heroes”97. Those 
brought back in returned at the same rank and salaries as those who did not participate in 
the coups or those who remained in the military after the coups. The test to this article 
will come later this year when those reintegrated members go in front of the promotion 
boards. Since the President is the deciding authority on promotions, without any civilian 
oversight, how fair and transparent will the system be for the officers that did not 
participate in the coup? A very dangerous division within the armed force between the 
coup participants and those who opposed it or did not participate can be exacerbated.  
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President Chavez on many occasions has stated that his mandate was given to him 
by the failed coup and by the people. For Chavez the failed coup was the beginning of the 
“democratic revolution” in Venezuela. He also stated, “ That day has more relevance to 
Venezuela than independence day¼”98 He ordered that the story of the Bolivarian 
revolution, and in particular the coup, be part of the curriculum to be studied by the 
military cadets at the Venezuelan Military Academy.99 Traditionally the 23rd of January, 
the day in 1958 that the dictatorship of General Perez Jimenez was vanquished, was 
celebrated as the day democracy began in Venezuela. In 2001, for the second year in a 
row, January 23rd went by without any official involvement to commemorate this day by 
members of the executive. This contrasts with the four days of celebrations and parades 
that commemorate the failed coup.  
By making the failed coup the heart of his mandate, and letting those who 
rebelled against the legitimately established regime back into the Armed Forces, 
President Chávez sends strong signals about the character of his government. Also, 
Venezuela was the only country in Latin America that did not condemn the coup-de-ètat 
that brought down president Mahuad in Ecuador in January 2000. In fact, President 
Chávez praised the military and rebellious indigenous population in Ecuador, for standing 
up against oppression. He said, “What I saw in Ecuador was the 25,000 Indians and the 
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military together leading a rebellion against a regime and system that has oppressed 
them…”100 -- a very disturbing statement for many democratic observers. 
C. THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY 
In addition to increasing the role of the military in government and politics, 
President Chavez has used the military to execute social programs to assist in the 
development of the country. Some of the most notable examples are Plan Bolivar 2000 
and the Bolivarian schools. 
1. Plan Bolivar 2000 
President Chávez announced that he would be deploying the Armed Forces in 
what he termed “Plan Bolivar 2000”. The initial intent of this Plan was to deploy the 
Armed Forces as a temporary measure to “jumpstart” other institutions that had been 
inefficient, corrupt and made “rotten” by 40 years of partyarchy in Venezuela.101  
President Chávez dismisses any criticisms to his plans by saying that “the Armed Forces 
should be prepared to work for the development, the peace, and the progress of our 
people”. 102  Plan Bolivar 2000 is an ambitious social plan to use the Armed Forces in the 
reactivation of the economy and the development of the country.  
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The Plan is a massive civil-military undertaking consisting of three phases: Plan 
Pro-Pais (short term), Pro-Patria, and Pro-Nacion (long term).103 Each phase could 
count with the deployment of up to 50,000 troops in 26 newly developed “social theaters 
of operations” all across Venezuela. The military will be in charge of these social 
theaters, and in determining the priorities of the projects and missions. The local garrison 
commander manages his own budget and coordinates directly with local civilian 
authorities.  
The first phase, Pro-Pais104, is designed to take care of the most urgent needs. It 
called for installation of ambulatory hospitals to vaccinate the poor and provide dental 
care, cleanup of gutters and buildings, small construction projects and road repair, 
opening of “social routes” (air routes using Venezuelan Air Force transportation aircraft 
to allow the poor to move around Venezuela), and even soldiers setting up local markets 
to sell cheap produce. 
The second phase, Pro-Patria,105 encompasses medium to long-term projects. It 
will continue the projects of medical and dental attention, improvement and 
infrastructure, social routes and the “popular” local markets. In this phase more complex 
projects such as employment and literacy programs (Plan Zamora 2000) will be 
undertaken. The Venezuelan Navy will start a fishing project that instructs citizens to fish 
as well as providing fish at low prices. Finally, Plan Casicare 2000106 is a project that 
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deals directly with indigenous populations by improving the infrastructure in their 
communities, including the laying of electricity lines and opening road networks to give 
them access to other communities.  
The third stage, Pro-Nacion107, is the long-term phase of Bolivar 2000. During 
this phase major infrastructure projects will be undertaken, especially the development of 
two major geo-political axes in the long-neglected southern zone of Venezuela. For 
example, the Orinoco-Apure Axis focuses on developing infrastructure in the Amazonian 
basin, an area that is important for defending national borders. 
When Bolivar 2000 was first put into action, its acceptability was very high. 
Many observers knew of the capabilities and equipment of the Armed Forces and praised 
the fact that they were now being used to benefit the country. Many local governments 
were pleased with the efficiency of the troops and happy that these projects were being 
done (and funded) by the central government. Speaking about Plan Bolivar 2000, former 
Foreign Affairs Minister Jose Vicente Rangel stated, “Can a country with the needs of 
Venezuela give itself the luxury of having unused installed capacity, like personnel from 
the armed forces? If we need engineers, sociologists and lawyers, must we dispense with 
them simply because they wear a uniform?”108  Many military officers welcomed their 
new role. General Victor Cruz Weffer, of the newly created Corps of Engineers and 
commander of one of the social theaters, said, “We’ve been underutilized. We have the 
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capacity, the will and the organization to do a lot of things¼”109 But not all members of 
the military felt the same way; in fact reaction to the new roles and functions has been 
mixed.  
The honeymoon period for Plan Bolivar 2000 was short lived. Some of the 
projects began to stall, mainly because the same troops used for the Plan are also used to 
guarantee security and logistics during elections. Since Venezuela has had four elections 
and three referenda in two years, the troops have only been able to devote themselves part 
time to civic actions tasks.  
When the projects stalled, problems with the entire civic-action project began to 
be brought to light. One of the main problems is that garrison commanders are in charge 
of all the projects and also the funding of them.  Some local government officials 
complain that monies that were due to their governments are now being managed by the 
military. In addition, the “special funds” that go directly to the military commander are 
not subject to accounting inspections. Many perceive this as corruption. The biggest 
problem arising from this project is that because the military members are in close 
contact with the citizens, it has given them a platform to do political proselytism and, in 
two cases, launch the candidacy of active-duty military members to the positions of state 
governors.110 (When their nominations were accepted by the CNE, the officers were 
allowed to resign from the Armed Forces.)  
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Criticism of the civic action program has also come from within the military. 
Former Minister of Defense Ochoa Antich, state, “ The civic actions have depleted our 
combat readiness. It is worrisome. This is an unhealthy politicization of the military with 
serious consequences for their professional qualities and for national defense”111 
Additionally, some of the tactical commanders have expressed concerns about spending 
all their time doing civic actions operations and election support.112 They fear that they 
are losing their ability to conduct their tactical missions. President Chávez has often told 
the Armed Forces when explaining to them their participation in this plan, that they have 
something society lacks (“discipline”) and that the biggest security threat to Venezuela is 
not external but within their society. 113 
2. The Bolivarian Schools 
President Chávez has also employed the military to run the Bolivarian Schools, 
the “educational vanguard of his social revolution”. The plan is for the Bolivarian schools 
to replace regular public schools, which are attended by seventy percent of school age 
children. They offer a full-day program, including after school child care, breakfast, 
lunch and a snack, and the children have access to military health providers. The health 
team of pediatricians, a social worker, a nutritionist and four psychologists, all report to a 
colonel in charge of the school.114  
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In most of the Bolivarian Schools, classes are instructed by civilian professors, 
and the books and class contents are still the same as all others schools. However, Ms. 
Maria Uribe, the first coordinator of the Bolivarian schools program, states “there are 
plans to update the texts and classes in order to adapt the schools to the new constitution 
and the needs of the nation115” This update in texts and the entire Bolivarian schools 
program have been criticized by many. Guillermo Moron, a well-known historian and 
educator reject this program as “purely political, and it opens up the way to ideological 
indoctrination and militarization116”. Others criticize the entire program not only for the 
militarization of education but what they call the “Cubanization” of education. The oil 
cooperation agreement President Chávez signed with President Fidel Castro in October 
2000 includes “Cuban cooperation in the consolidation of the Bolivarian schools, through 
joint teacher training and curriculum development programs.”117 The Bolivarian schools 
have also been criticized as another social program that utilizes the military in a role that 
hinders their ability to perform their primary mission of defending the nation. 
D. STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL GOVERNANCE OF THE MILITARY  
Since President Chavez came in to the government there has been a tremendous 
debate about the structure and internal governance of the military.  The intent of this 
reorganization makes the force into a joint single force, with one single doctrine, one 
single budget and integrated unity of command. The once complicated intelligence 
apparatus will be consolidated into one branch under one person. The models that have 
                                                 





been studied for this reorganization are the Cuban model and the Prussian model. 118 
Critics of this reorganization note that unifying under one command creates an element 
that responds to only one person, the Commander in Chief. Although many militaries are 
shifting to unified commands, under a Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the case of Venezuela 
there is fear that the president is taking advantage of this reorganization to further 
politicize the Armed Forces and create a powerful instrument that will serve his political 
purposes.119 
1. Promotion Authority  
Article 330 of the Constitution gives the Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces (the President) the exclusive power to promote officers from a list submitted by 
the service chiefs through the Minister of Defense (MOD).”120  In the past the Senate had 
to approve this list, after a lengthy process in which each component Commander 
presented the list to the Armed Services Committee of the Senate. The President was then 
given the already approved list for signature and execution. The new Constitutional 
article eliminates any civilian check and oversight to the president’s authority. 
In addition to the centralization of authority over the military that this entails, it 
also raises questions about the level of civilian control over the armed forces.  President 
Chávez calls himself “the first soldier of the Republic”121 and is often seen in public and 
official ceremonies wearing his Battle Dress Uniform (BDUs) and distinctive red beret. 
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Constitución de la Republica Bolivareana de Venezuela, 1999, Caracas, Venezuela, 23 March 2000. 
121 President Chávez inaugural speech given on 02 February 1999, at the Congressional Palace, 
Caracas, Venezuela accessed online at http://www.bitbiblioteca.com  
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He tells those who ask him why, “that he is and will always be a soldier”.  Thus, although 
the Armed Forces are subordinated to the executive the fact that Chávez considers 
himself military rather than civilian, leads some to some confusion about whether the 
military is subordinated to civilian control. 
2. Reorganization of the Armed Forces 
According to the Bolivarean Constitution, the Armed Forces must reorganize into 
a single joint force. The initial concept of this reorganiza tion makes the chain of 
command as follows: at the top would be the Minister of Defense, and in order of 
hierarchy the Armed Forces Inspector General and Chief of the General Staff. There 
would be no separate component chiefs. The intent here is to make the Armed Forces into 
a single force, with one single doctrine and budget and integrated unity of Command. The 
once complicated intelligence apparatus will be consolidated into one branch, under one 
person.  
Critics of this reorganization note that unifying the forces under one Command 
creates an element that responds to only one person, the Commander in Chief. Although 
many militaries are shifting to unified commands, under a Joint Chief of Staff, in the case 
of Venezuela there is fear that President Chávez is taking advantage of his particular 
situation to create a powerful instrument that will serve his political purposes.122 There is 
also concern about which service would have greater leverage at the top. Because of 
President Chávez’s past service in the Army.  Many observe that the Army is becoming 
the predominant service, which is causing some dissension among members of the other 
                                                 
122 Col (GN) Luis Morales Parada en Eucaris Perdono Orsini “Chávez esta llevando a la FAN a ser 
una milicia como la Cubana” accessed online at www.2001.com.ve/politica3.html 
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services. Former Minister of Defense, General Eliécer Hurtado emphatically denied 
this.123  
a. Civilian Minister of Defense 
During the celebrations of the failed coup in February 2001, President 
Chávez surprised all by announcing the designation of his former Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Jose Vicente Rangel, to be the new Minister of Defense (MOD). He was to 
become the first civilian in that position in Venezuela’s democratic era. While this might 
be considered an extremely positive step, because it is the pinnacle of the military 
subordination to civilian authority, two factors undermined its impact. First, President 
Chávez’s choice of minister led many to believe that Chávez was less interested in 
securing civilian control of the military, than in actively politicizing the armed forces and 
converting them into a political party that would serve Chávez’s “socialist” revolution. 
Jose Vicente Rangel is a well-known communist, with clear affection for Cuba and the 
Colombian leftist guerillas. Before the election of President Chávez, Rangel wrote 
editorials for a known Caracas newspaper, and hosted a TV program in which many 
times he blasted members of the military. Many see Rangel as the agent that will take 
Chávez’s political project to the heart of the Armed Force.124  
Second, the civilian MOD is not assigned the responsibilities or the 
civilian staff that is necessary for civilian control of Armed Forces. There are no 
provisions in the constitution or the proposed LOFAN for a civilian MOD to occupy the 
                                                 
123 Macky Arena, Globovisión Especial, Entrevista con Eliécer Hurtado Soucre, Ministro de la 
Defensa, Caracas, Venezuela, 31 March 2000 accessed online at 
http://www.analitica.com/va/politica/fuentes/8619947.asp [31 Mar 2000] 
124 Gabriel Silva Lujan, “Otro Montesinos?” La Semana, Bogotá, Colombia, 6 February 2001, 
accessed online at: http://www.lasemana.com.co [6 Feb 2001]  
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position. In an article written and published in June 1998 in the Venezuelan Military 
magazine, General Jacobo Yepez Daza states “ ¼From a professional standpoint, if the 
Armed Forces were to have a civilian as MOD, they must have an organization, structure 
and functions different as if the MOD comes within the organization¼”125 The civilian 
Minister will not even have an office at the MOD, but somewhere else, he will take care 
mainly of the administrative matters of running the force, while the operational matters 
will be taken under the wing of the new Commander of the Armed Force. The role of 
civilian MOD within the military chain of command hence is reduced to that of an 
administrative secretary.  For the civilian MOD to be an integral and effective voice in 
the formulation and implementation of defense policy, it must have a “…well funded 
ministry staffed with civilian and military experts…and a number of reforms are usually 
necessary to strengthen the role of the civilian ministry…”126  
b. Commander of the Armed Force 
At the same time that he appointed Rangel, President Chávez made 
another announcement, creating the figure of the Joint Commander of the Armed Force, a 
position that had been contemplated in the new LOFAN, but has not been approved yet. 
With this nomination, apparently, President Chávez was attempting to soften the blow to 
the military of removing the popular General Eliécer Hurtado as MOD. This new position 
will operate from the same office the former Minister had at the MOD, and be in charge 
of all operational and training requirements of the Armed Force. In addition, President 
Chávez announced that the Commander of the Armed Force would take over the role and 
                                                 
125 Ibid. 
126 Jeanne K. Giraldo, draft civil-military relations paper, “The National Security framework: What 
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functions of the Inspector General. President Chávez also said that he too would have an 
office within the MOD and, as the Commander in Chief, run some functions of the 
military. 127  
2. Use of the Military in Internal Security 
The proposed reorganization includes new roles for the Armed Force in the 
development of the nation and in guaranteeing the internal security. The National Guard, 
modeled after the Spanish Guardia Nacional, has traditionally been assigned to guard the 
borders, operate customs offices, and conduct counter narcotic operations. A subordinate 
of the MOD, it retains arrest authority and has been given an expanded role in internal 
policing under Chávez. In addition, those drafting the proposed Organic Law of the 
Armed Force (LOFAN) are currently debating the inclusion of a role for the military in 
internal police activities128. This would represent a dangerous militarization of internal 
security.  Chávez has already used the military in internal security roles – troops conduct 
internal security mission in the Theater of Operations on the border with Colombia and  
“Cazador” battalions now face charges of human rights violations after their use during 
flooding in Vargas state.  The proposed law would represent a dangerous 
institutionalization and widening of this trend. 
                                                 
do countries legislate”, Naval Post-graduate School, March 2001. 
127 Javier Ignacio Mayorca, “Chavez tambien tendra una oficina en Fuerte Tiuna”, El Nacional, 1 
March 2001, accessed online at: http://www.el-nacional.com/eln01032001/pd1s2.htm [1 Mar 2001] 
128 Enrique Prieto Silva, “Hacia dónde van nuestras fuerzas armadas?” Venezuela Analitica, Caracas, 
Venezuela, 21 July 2000.  
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E. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The following table summarizes the overall level of military prerogatives in 
Venezuela (high, medium, or low) and shows whether they have increased under Chávez 
(a “+” indicates an increase, 0 no change, and “—“ a decrease).  
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Table 2. Table of Military Prerogatives in Venezuela 
 
Totaling the evaluation of these prerogatives, it can be seen that military 
prerogatives in Venezuela have increased under Hugo Chávez Frias and are dangerously 
high. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Chávez’s policies favoring the use of the military in a political role have alarmed 
not only the Venezuelans themselves, but also neighboring countries. Some of President 
Chávez’s actions have led to questions about the future of democracy in Venezuela. What 
is the nature of his project? Is it a civil-military project or a military-civil project? Here, 
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unlike in math, the order of the factors does alter the product. Is Venezuela truly 
“navigating the same sea of happiness as Cuba”129 as President Chávez declared in 
Havana in November 1999? He counts Cuba and Fidel Castro as his most important 
international ally and the Cuban Revolution an example to emulate130. Many observers 
believe he is concentrating too much power in his own hands, creating in the military a 
very powerful political party and moving Venezuela dangerously close to a dictatorship. 
Others believe that he is conducting a “slow motion” or “democratic” coup131 to 
accomplish what he failed to do in 1992.  
Venezuela’s apparent militarization concerns its regional neighbors, especially 
Colombia. Colombia has serious problems of its own fighting insurgency and drug 
trafficking. They fear that a military state in neighboring Venezuela can be dangerous 
because of its nationalistic roots, which can be used for political purposes on 
controversial border disputes.   
Chávez acts and speaks in a military fashion and often wears his uniform at public 
events and acts.132 He has increased the role of the military in the running of government 
and in solving social problems.133 One common view of the state of militarization in 
                                                 
129 Entrevista exlusiva al Presidente de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez Frias, “Tengo un reto en la Cumbre 
Iberoamericana de la Havana porque ahi se oira la voz del pueblo Venezolano”, Marta Rojas, Diario 
Granma, La Havana, Cuba, November 1999 accessed online at http://granma.cu/documento/espanol/044-
e.html [27 Nov 2000] 
130 Ibid. 
131 Maxwell A. Cameron, Associate Professor, University of British Columbia, Canada “Elections in a 
hybrid regime: Civil-Military Relations and Caesarism in Peru” prepared for delivery at the 2000 meeting 
of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), Miami, Florida, March 16-18, 2000 
132 Carlos A Romero “Chávez un año en el poder”, Venezuela Analitica, 11 February 2000, accessed 
online at http://www.analitica.com/va/politica.asp [2 Feb 2000] 
133 Ibid. 
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Venezuela is that Chávez is completing a political agenda, which has as the most 
important component the fusion of Armed Forces, Citizens (Pueblo) and Leader 
(Caudillo)134. The other view is that once he completes his political project and begins 
paying more attention to other problems (e.g., the economy), he will disengage somewhat 
from his militaristic views and pay more attention to subject matter experts regardless of 
whether they are military or not. 
President Chávez has not technically violated the military subordination to 
civilian control that is necessary for democratic control; however, his self-description as 
the “first soldier” is problematic. Additionally, relying on the military to accomplish his 
political objectives does endanger democracy.  The expansion of military roles into 
spheres usually resolved for civilians is contrary to the principles of liberal democracy. 
In summary, up until now President Chávez indeed has changed the political 
landscape of Venezuela. He has given the military a much greater and visible role in civic 
projects and in the running of government. If President Chávez’s programs fail, or as in 
the case of the civic action programs (Bolivar 2000) stall, it reflects badly on the military 
as an institution. This failure is linked tightly to its efficiency to undertake even its 
primary role, which is the defense of the country. Being scrutinized in the political arena 
tarnishes the once clean and incorruptible military institution. The divisions created by 
politicizing the military are dangerous for democracy in the long run.  
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Until recently, Venezuela was considered one of the longest lasting consolidated 
democracies in Latin America. Since 1958 it had respected most democratic institutions 
and had free and fair elections every five years. Transitions from one government to the 
next were always transparent, peaceful and successful. Two very strong political parties, 
AD and COPEI, completely dominated the political space and culture in Venezuela by 
creating strong roots in society and obtaining legitimacy within the population in periodic 
elections.  There was steady inter-party competition and stable political rules and 
structures. However, the parties’ inability to provide basic needs and services and 
economic crisis began a breakdown of the system. The most visible examples of this 
were the urban riots, known as the “Caracazo,” in February 1989, and the coup attempts 
by members of one of the most trusted institutions, the military.  The collapse of the two-
party system became evident at the polls starting with the elections of Rafael Caldera to 
the presidency in 1994.  The crisis of the parties was so great that, by 1998, the most 
vociferous critic of the traditional parties, who had plotted against them in the 1992 coup 
attempts, was elected president. 
The election of Hugo Chávez to the presidency exacerbated the fears of many 
observers who were already concerned about the future of democracy in Venezuela. 
Some of President Chávez’s words and actions have led many to believe that he is a new 
Latin American populist who will become more and more authoritarian with time. Others 
argue that Chávez is a true democrat; although his model of participative democracy 
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model has not yet been able to overcome 40 years of partyarchy, it will show results in 
time. This chapter will argue that President Chávez is closer to the former than the latter. 
It shows that Chávez’s behavior not only fails to conform to a model of liberal 
democracy but that it betrays his own vision of a participative democracy. It concludes by 
describing U.S. policy toward Venezuela and offering policy recommendations. 
A. MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 
This thesis began by discussing four different models of democracy -- electoral, 
liberal, delegative, and substantive -- in order to understand the existing academic and 
policy debates and examine President Chávez’s vision of participative democracy.  It 
began by discussing two minimalist notions of democracy.  Electoral democracies require 
only that free and fair elections be held periodically for a polity to qualify as democratic; 
only a minimal level of civil liberties and opposition are necessary for elections to be 
considered free and fair. Delegative democracy is a version of electoral democracy that 
emphasizes how elections give the executive the mandate to solve social and economic 
problems, as he deems best, without being constrained by other branches of government, 
opposition resistance or interest groups.  Liberal democracies represent a more expansive 
procedural notion of democracy, calling for respect to civil liberties and human rights, 
checks and balances, military subordination to civilian rule, the rule of law, and a 
pluralistic political and civil society. A substantive democracy stresses social and 
economic rights, almost always at the expense of civil liberties, and calls for popular 
participation through state-organized channels 
President Chávez loathes representative democracy. He truly believes this model 
caused all the problems Venezuela has now. In Chávez’s model of participative 
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democracy, like in O’Donnell’s “delegative democracy,” horizontal accountability is 
sacrificed to vertical accountability. Chávez often states that the people gave him a 
legitimate order when they elected him in December 1998, and he treats this “order” or 
mandate as a military type command, to be executed disregarding other democratic 
institutions, public opinion, or any opposition. He is determined to eradicate the “corrupt 
elites” from all institutions of government and give a new voice to the people in 
governing. As an example after winning the presidential elections he stated, “Let us 
launch a revolutionary new model for Venezuela”. 135  In his participative model he mixes 
some elements of various other models of democracies. He created two more “popular” 
branches of government, the moral and electoral, which would demand accountability 
from the other branches and the executive as well. Additionally, the constitution allows 
the use of a recall to evaluate his performance.  
The following sections summarize the evidence that shows the challenge that 
Chávez’s vision of democracy and his actions represent to liberal democracy.  It also 
shows how, in practice, Chavez’s behavior undermines his own vision of participative 
democracy.  
B. ELECTIONS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
In this area President Chávez has respected the minimal conditions that must exist 
in an electoral model of democracy. In keeping with his model of participative 
democracy he introduced mechanisms to allow for more popular participation in 
decision-making. Under President Chávez, there have been three elections and three 
                                                 
135 “Chávez promises revolutionary change” Tuesday, 1 August 2000, BBC news, accessed online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_860000/860623.stm [26 Feb 2001] 
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referenda. Although there have been problems, some of them serious, all of the elections 
have been conducted successfully. One of the most serious criticisms Chávez has faced is 
that the members of the electoral commission, which enforces electoral laws, are all 
Chávez loyalists selected by the MVR-dominated legislature. The departure from the 
Venezuelan tradition (and international standard) of a neutral or a politically 
representative board troubles many.  
In the area of human rights, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) decry 
that human rights violations in Venezuela have not gotten better since President Chávez 
took charge, and in some instances they have increased.  However, there is no evidence 
that the increase is the result of a systematic government policy, and there have been 
improvements in some areas, especially the language included in the constitution to 
address human rights.    
With respect to civil liberties, President Chávez’s actions violate liberal and 
participative models of democracy. Although the government and the constitution permit 
freedom of speech and press and no censorship exist, the excessive amount of 
government intimidation, especially the constant attacks and threats by the president to 
the media, is extremely worrisome. Chávez’s practice of calling anyone who opposes or 
criticizes him a “traitor”, “enemy” or “corrupt oligarch” is not conducive to the give and 
take of democracy. The truthful information clause in the constitution is troublesome and 
could very easily be used to censor the media.  
The constitution permits the freedom of assembly and association. However, a 
TSJ ruling severely restricting the definition of civil society represents a clear violation of 
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the independence and autonomy of civil society organizations. The referendum convoked 
by the president to attempt to democratize labor unions can be seen as a governmental 
attempt to control labor unions, under the leadership of their own labor force.  
C. CHECKS AND BALANCES 
In this area again President Chávez’s actions violate the model of liberal 
democracy by controlling all the branches of the government through appointed loyalists.  
When these loyalists have acted against his wishes, he has either overturned their 
decisions personally (e.g., in the writing of the Constitution) or used other branches of 
government against them (e.g., the TSJ undermining the Attorney General’s investigation 
into corruption). On other occasions, members of branches who disagree with the 
president realize that, given the centralization of power in the figure of the president, 
resistance is futile.  Instead of attempting to act independently and check the president, 
they resign in protest over his policies (e.g., the original Supreme Court, the bicameral 
legislature, and members of the second CNE).    
All political and democratic institutions continue to exist although there have 
been considerable changes. The unicameral National Assembly (AN) replaced the 
bicameral Congress. The  Supreme Justice dissolved itself, when the ANC, originally 
mandated to only write the constitution, began to legislate and declared a judicial 
emergency. Eventually, the Supreme Judicial Tribunal (TSJ), made up with the alternate 
magistrates replaced it.  
The two branches created to conform to Chávez’s participative notion of 
democracy also show evidence of not being able to act autonomously. The moral branch 
of government acted independently in investigating alleged corruption and was seriously 
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criticized by the president and his followers for lack of loyalty. When the National 
Assembly was finally installed, the new members of the moral branch were selected and 
all are members of the official party. The National Assembly has appointed all the CNE 
members. Although they have conducted the electoral processes successfully, some of 
their actions and decisions have been questioned because of their loyalty to Chavez’s 
party.    
Finally, the constitution centralizes much of the power in the figure of the 
president, which is troublesome. It provides the president the power to declare a state of 
exemption and rule by the decree, even to dissolve the National Assembly. Chávez has 
promised to use his decree powers to launch new radical and ambitious economic and 
social programs. In his words his “peaceful revolution” is succeeding. “Every little grain 
of sand goes toward building the mountain. There are new roads, and school for the kids, 
and telephone lines.”136 
D. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The political and social use of the armed forces violates principles of liberal 
democracy. Chávez often states that there must exist a fusion between the military and 
the people, which is essential for his participative model. The Armed Forces continue to 
be subordinated to the civilian executive, but whether this constitutes civilian control is 
questionable since Chávez considers himself a soldier. President Chávez has increased 
the role of the Armed Forces in society, the government and politics. The Armed Forces 
participate in massive civil-military projects (Projecto Bolivar 2000 and 2001). An active 
                                                 
136 “Chávez: End 'Tyranny of the Small Elite’, Washington Post, Sunday October 15, 2000, accessed 
online at http://www.washintongpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7305-2000Oct14.html [20 Oct 2000] 
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duty military officer runs almost every ministry in the government, as well as the most 
important state industries (oil, aluminum, and electricity). This militarization of the 
government has set off alarms, as many critics state the dangers of involving military 
personnel in political tasks. The new constitution increases the political role of the Armed 
Forces by allowing them the right to vote, and taking away the apolitical and non-
deliberative clauses.  
E. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
A central element of substantive democracy and delegative democracy is the 
notion that the “ends justify the means.”  Democracy is served if the president helps “the 
people” by solving an economic crisis, a terrorist threat, or corruption, regardless of the 
methods employed. Like Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto Fujimori in Peru, 
Chávez was elected because of his promise to solve his country’s economic problems and 
to eradicate corruption. In contrast to the other two presidents, who produced results 
quickly, Chávez has not. No one accused of corruption is in prison, and allegations of 
corruption continue in this government. Many criticize Chávez for spending too much 
time on his political project and doing no thing to solve Venezuela’s deep recession, all of 
this despite receiving the highest revenue from the price of oil being the highest in over 
twenty years. Unemployment has risen to almost an uncontrollable rate, many private 
sector firms have shutdown, and international firms have left the country or stayed away 
altogether. The investment country-risk factor in Venezuela is extremely high. The 
government has managed to contain inflation but many say this is because people are just 
not buying goods.  
 88
Despite an anti “savage neoliberal” discourse Chávez’s macroeconomic policies 
have been consistent with free-market policies. Elliot Abrams, former Under Secretary 
for Western Hemisphere Affairs notes, “the consensus in Washington is that Chávez’s 
economic policies are highly populist and are not going to create what the people of 
Venezuela need and want, and us too, which is growth and employment, this is sad.”137 
Ambassador Hrinak states, “Chávez’s rhetoric hurts international investments greatly, in 
particular from U.S. companies willing to invest in Venezuela. You pay a price from all 
the rhetoric.”138 President Chávez has taken an active role in OPEC, visiting each 
member country and also hosting the OPEC summit in Caracas. He presses hard to 
maintain the price of oil high.  
The following table represents how President Chavez’s vision matches with the 
evidence presented in this thesis and how, in practice, participative democracy more 
closely resembles a delegative type of democracy.   
E. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS CHAVEZ 
In its National Security Strategy, the United States has an extensive agenda for the 
promotion of democracy in the region. It seeks not only to promote the holding of free 
and fair elections, but also to strengthen democratic institutions and practices, such as a 
strong judiciary, respect for human rights, and military subordination to civilian rule.  
                                                 
137 Carlos Subero, “EEUU evitará que Chávez “los culpe de problemas’”, El Universal, Caracas, 
Venezuela, 25 January 2001, accessed online at: 
http://www.archivo.eluniversal.com/2001/01/25/25110BB.shtml [26 Jan 2001] 
138 Interview with US Ambassador to Venezuela Donna Hrinak by Fabiola Zerpa, “No veo por qué 
EEUU tiene que aparecer como enemigo y opositor de Venezuela”, El Nacional, Caracas, Venezuela, 11 
March 2001, accessed online at: http://www.el-nacional.com/eln11032001/pa6s1.htm [11 Mar 2001] 
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These democratic measures can be promoted either through diplomatic means or through 
democracy assistance programs. 
Elements of 
Democracy 
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Table 3. Democratic Measures. 
 
Despite this broad agenda, the United States’ position has typically been and 
continues to be one of electoralism, demanding respect for free and fair elections as the 
most important litmus test for democracy in a country. When he was appointed by 
President George W. Bush as the Western Hemisphere Adviser in the National Security 
Council (NSC), former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, John F. Maisto stated, “…at the 
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end of the day the Venezuela people democratically elected him [Chávez] to govern the 
country….”139   
Similarly, Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
on a visit to Caracas stated, “we support the processes in which the government, the 
National Constituent Assembly and now the National Assembly have allowed the people 
of Venezuela to participate through elections in these political changes. We recognize 
that Venezuela is living a crucial time in their history and we wish the best for the 
culmination of the process.”140 He also stated the “we need to judge President Chávez for 
what he does and not what he says….”141 In another interview former Under Secretary 
for Western Hemisphere Affairs stated, “ In Washington there is no clear answer as to 
where President Chávez’s project is heading….”142 
The harshest criticism to Chávez’s actions have come form Ambassador Peter 
Romero, Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, who in an interview 
stated, “ …we do not see a direction in the government from Chávez, only plebiscites, 
referendums and more elections, they keep telling us to wait for the process but we 
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‘gringos’ (Americans) are not known to be patient….”143 This created tensions in the 
country’s bilateral relations, when news reports appeared in the U.S. media about 
Chávez’s involvement in insurgency and revolutionary movements in Ecuador and 
Bolivia, again citing Ambassadors Romero’s statements, President Chávez called  
Romero 'Pinocchio' and said that “it is saddening that officials that blatantly lie are 
allowed to serve in the government of the United States”. 144 
Today under a new administration, the U.S. is paying closer attention not only to 
Chávez’s actions but also to his words. U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, Donna Hrinak 
states,  
I do not concur with th[e] opinion [of Ambassador Pickering to judge 
Chávez “for what he does and not what he says”]. The words stated by a 
president have some weight. Before, Chávez was in a constant electoral 
campaign, and when someone is a candidate many things can be excused. 
Ours, too, but when then get elected to the presidency, well… we have a 
saying ‘where you stand is where you sit, which means that the stand a 
person takes depends on the position he occupies. People react to what the 
president says. He is the ultimate leader of the country; we need to believe 
what he says.145  
Many other political actors have indicated that they will pay careful attention to 
Chávez’s actions. Congressman Lincoln Diaz Ballart states, “What the position of the 
U.S. government will be depends on the actions of Chávez…. His government has 
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legitimacy since he cleanly won the elections and later conducted a constitutional reform 
process which was approved by a large majority, but that legitimacy is lost if democracy 
is not exercised.”146  
For the most part the U.S. government’s position has been a very patient cordial 
one of “wait and see.” President Chávez is a popular and charismatic leader, who takes 
advantage of growing anti-American sentiment popular in Latin America.  The U.S. does 
not want to push him to become the second Fidel Castro or increase his levels of support 
by providing fuel for his anti-American appeals.147 The political, economic and security 
interests of the United States in the entire region far outweigh the concerns with any 
challenge President Chavez presents to democracy. The U.S. has had to limit its 
promotion of democracy to free and fair elections, and even this is hard to do at times. 
There is the regional security threat with the conflict in Colombia and the narcotic threat. 
Additionally, Venezuela has continued to be a trusted and reliable oil exporter to the U.S. 
and one of the biggest trading partners in the region. 
President Chavez and his government have continuously sent mixed signals as to 
the state of bilateral relations by signaling their willingness to act contrary to U.S. 
interests. Chávez continues to venerate Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution, befriends 
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Libya’s Muamar al-Quaddafi and other tyrants, fails to cooperate 
in the war against drugs by denying U.S. planes to over fly Venezuela, and at every 
opportunity speaks about creating another geo-political axis to compete against the uni-
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polar U.S. world. He continues to criticize the involvement of the U.S. in Colombia, in 
particular the military assistance in Plan Colombia, and he has established numerous 
contacts with Colombian guerrillas.  Colombian President Andres Pastrana states, “I’m 
asking Chávez, please stay in your yard and we’ll manage our own problems. We don’t 
talk about internal problems in Venezuela, because we don’t them to intervene in 
domestic issues in Colombia. If he contacts guerillas, we want him to tell us first.”148    
In sum, the United States has taken a wait and see attitude for two reasons. First is 
the inherent difficulty of promoting democracy, especially in a country with a 
democratically elected leader promoting a different vision of democracy. Second, U.S. 
policy makers are concerned with promoting other economic and security interests in the 
region. The following section will address the usefulness of different measures for 
promoting democracy in Venezuela and suggest that standing up to Chávez and his anti-
democratic attitudes can serve the interest of regional security and political stability.   
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
The U.S. has employed two major policy tools for promoting democracy in the 
last two decades: diplomatic measures that largely focus on ensuring free and fair 
elections and preventing coups and democracy assistance programs that seek to 
strengthen democratic institutions.  The following sections discuss the potential 
usefulness of these tools in promoting democracy in Chavez’s Venezuela. 
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1. Diplomatic tools to Promote Democracy  
Recent experiences have shown that the United States cannot act unilaterally to 
prevent any serious attack to democracy. The international community will not support 
the United States unless total anarchy reigns in the country or there has been a coup. The 
case of Alberto Fujimori in Peru demonstrates this: The OAS sent an electoral 
observation mission to monitor the elections. The mission determined that President 
Fujimori had used fraudulent means to get elected for a third term. The United States 
attempted to stop the fraudulent election by asking the members of the OAS to speak out 
against them. OAS member nations went against their own observation mission to oppose 
the strong actions advocated by the U.S. The reaction by the other OAS members was 
lukewarm to the U.S. attempts to act against this blatant violation of democracy. Member 
nations “haunted by memories of past U.S. intrusions in their domestic affairs, have 
chosen non- intervention over a strong stance for democracy,”149 and instead signed on to 
send a high- level commission to “study” the situation in Peru. The United States took the 
lead to denounce and declare the Peruvian elections invalid but neither the OAS electoral 
commission nor the U.S. received support.  
Although unable to rely on other Latin American countries to encourage 
democracy in Venezuela, there are still a number of diplomatic steps the U.S. can take to 
promote democracy there and in the region.  The U.S. should:  
· Maintain pressure for actions against human rights violations, by 
presenting evidence in yearly reports, and actively supporting NGOs, 
which fight for these causes 
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· Continue to stand firm and repudiate President Chavez’s dealings and 
friendships with tyrants (e.g., Castro, Saddam) who reject democracy 
· Support the Andean Initiative and Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) 
as a contribution to democratic stability in the region 
· Continue to stand firm on U.S. interests in the Andean region, but insuring 
that U.S. actions do not provoke President Chavez to become a second 
Castro 
· Reassure the rest of the Andean countries that the U.S. will not tolerate 
President Chavez’s support for anti-democratic movements within 
neighboring countries 
· Insist on Venezuela’s support for the regional counter drug fight, by 
allowing U.S. over flights in pursuit of drug movements 
2. Democracy Assistance Programs and Recommendations  
Since the mid-1980s, democracy assistance programs have become a significant 
element of United States efforts to promote democracy. The U.S. accomplishes this goal 
primarily with programs conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). There are also democracy assistance programs at the Department of State, The 
Department of Defense, The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) among others. The United States is not alone in this 
endeavor. Other countries also have their programs and international institutions to foster 
democracy. 
In Venezuela, the United States Info rmation System (USIS) through the cultural 
section of the U.S. Embassy in Caracas manages programs for the promotion of 
democracy. Several have been extremely positive and must continue. For example, the 
CIVITAS Venezuela program created a democracy education network with the 
participation of many civil society organizations.150  There is also a student and professor 
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exchange program between the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) and St. John 
Fisher College, which included at one point the creation of a Center for the Study of 
Democracy and Human Rights. NDI has been assisting Venezuelan civic groups with 
electoral reform initiatives and observation. The civic groups Escuela De Vecinos de 
Venezuela (School of Neighbors of Venezuela- EVV) and Queremos Elegir continue to 
run multifaceted civic action and monitoring programs to increase citizen participation in 
electoral reforms. These two action groups have been constant watchdogs in all of the 
electoral processes that have taken place since Chávez came to power, as well as the 
constitutional reform processes151. The Department of Defense runs similar programs 
through military to military exchanges and by sponsoring military officers to attend 
courses on civil-military relations at U.S. institutions. All of this democracy assistance 
programs have continued under President Chávez’s government.  
The U.S. should continue to support the programs for democracy already in place 
and continue to organize and educate civil society to prevent attacks to democracy.  
Specifically, the U.S. should: 
· Continue to support international delegations of election observers, to 
ensure election processes are fair and transparent 
·  Continue to support programs to reform the judiciary and the rule of law, 
to ensure equal justice and respect to civil liberties 
· Continue to strengthen civil society, specifically those organizations that 
bolster democracy, and educate citizens about democracy 
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· Aid political parties to reform themselves to become a viable pluralistic 
and strong opposition 
This last step is particularly important.  So far President Chávez has been 
extremely effective at taking advantage of the crisis of the traditional party system and 
preventing the growth of an institutionalized opposition.  The parties need to be rebuilt 
and strengthened in order to present realistic solutions to the problems faced by the 
people. They must regain the trust of the population. This is the most important step for 
promoting democracy in the medium to long run. 
G. ONE FINAL WORD 
There is no doubt in anybody’s mind that change was needed in Venezuela. 
President Chávez took advantage of this and got elected. He promised the people great 
changes in politics, social justice, and corruption. In two years the only real change he 
has managed is to change the entire landscape of Venezuela’s politics. The problem with 
his political project, which resembles delegative democracy much more than participative 
democracy, is that it has not produced results. Unemployment, economic growth and cost 
of living, corruption and crime are the areas that affect citizens more, but which have not 
been improved. The other problem with Chávez’s political-participative democracy 
model so far, is that it is based on a weak and fragile government. His legitimacy is the 
charisma of the leader and, unless promises are fulfilled, charisma and popularity do not 
last forever. President Chávez has surrounded himself with a small group of advisors, 
some of them military, but the circle is not deep, and it centers on the decisions of 
Chávez himself.  
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The growing number of social and economic problems which have not been 
attended to, the inevitable fall of oil prices and the revenue that it provides, weak 
government with weak institutions, the continued discomfort among the military, and the 
government’s dwindling popularity lead me to believe that Venezuela is at the cross 
roads.  There are several paths Venezuela might follow.  One is that President Chávez 
declares a state of exemption and becomes repressive and authoritarian when he is faced 
with deeper problems and waning popularity. Second is the democratic solution, in which 
opposition to Chavez is expressed at the next election or referendum. Third, the military 
grows increasingly disenchanted with President Chavez’s support for Marxist insurgents 
in Colombia and his politicization of the armed forces and conducts a coup against his 
regime.  The second path is the only one consistent with the United States’ promotion of 
democracy in the region.   
The United States must continue its “wait and see” attitude, remaining alert to the 
threats to democracy posed by the actions and words of President Chávez, and supporting 
aid programs to bolster democracy in Venezuela. The only way the democratic solution 
referred to above will work is with a strong and capable opposition. For this solution, the 
United States and other countries must help the political parties strengthen themselves so 
they can express growing popular discontent and take advantage of the gaps left by 
President Chávez’s government. This is the only way democracy will triumph in 
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